DESIGN OF A TAILORABLE PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY FRAMEWORK INCLUDING ALTERNATING SPACE-TIME CODING AND GRAY CODE HOPPING by Cribbs, Michael R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2021-06
DESIGN OF A TAILORABLE PHYSICAL LAYER
SECURITY FRAMEWORK INCLUDING
ALTERNATING SPACE-TIME CODING AND GRAY
CODE HOPPING
Cribbs, Michael R.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/67689
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








DESIGN OF A TAILORABLE PHYSICAL LAYER 
SECURITY FRAMEWORK INCLUDING 
ALTERNATING SPACE-TIME CODING AND GRAY 
CODE HOPPING 
by 
Michael R. Cribbs 
June 2021 
Dissertation Supervisor: Ric Romero 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions 
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington, DC, 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 June 2021  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Dissertation 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
DESIGN OF A TAILORABLE PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY 
FRAMEWORK INCLUDING ALTERNATING SPACE-TIME CODING AND 
GRAY CODE HOPPING 
 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
 RENUT 
 6. AUTHOR(S) Michael R. Cribbs 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
NAVWAR (PMW-130), San Diego, CA 92110 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)     
 A physical layer security framework is developed that may be tailored to a particular wireless 
communications link. Alternating space-time coding and Gray code hopping techniques are presented that may be 
implemented individually or concurrently. The first technique may be utilized in any multiple-input 
multiple-output system with choice of single- or multi-space-time code configurations. Orthogonal, 
non-orthogonal, and spatially-multiplexed space-time codes are included to achieve a desired 
diversity-multiplexing balance in addition to demonstrated security benefits. Gray code hopping may be used in 
any system with common digital modulation schemes to “hop” between alternative binary reflected Gray code 
mappings of bits to complex-valued modulation symbols. Unlike similar constellation remapping techniques, 
Gray code hopping provides improved physical layer security against plaintext attacks without sacrificing bit error 
rate performance. To facilitate these schemes, we present two series of algorithms that systematically build large 
sets of unique alternative space-time codes and modulation mappings. Decoding methods are discussed to allow 
for channel equalization and symbol co-phasing when employing an alternating space-time code. Equivalent 
modulation/demodulation approaches are provided for Gray code hopping. Information-theoretic and 
computational security analysis, Monte Carlo simulations, and over-the-air testing are completed as confirmation 
of proposed methods. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
computational security, Gray coding, information-theoretic security, multiple-input 
multiple-output, physical layer security, space-time coding 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 171 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
DESIGN OF A TAILORABLE PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
INCLUDING ALTERNATING SPACE-TIME CODING AND GRAY CODE 
HOPPING 
Michael R. Cribbs 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
BS, University of Kansas, 2009 
MS, Electrical Engineering, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015 
EE, Electrical Engineer, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2021 
Approved by: Ric Romero Tri T. Ha 
Department of Department of 
Electrical and Computer Electrical and Computer 
Engineering Engineering 
Dissertation Supervisor Dissertation Co-Supervisor 
David C. Jenn Frank E. Kragh 
Department of Department of 
Electrical and Computer Electrical and Computer 
Engineering  Engineering 
Thor Martinsen Ric Romero 
Department of Department of 
Applied Mathematics Electrical and Computer 
Engineering 
Dissertation Chair 
Approved by: Douglas J. Fouts 
Chair, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
Orrin D. Moses 
Vice Provost of Academic Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 A physical layer security framework is developed that may be tailored to a 
particular wireless communications link. Alternating space-time coding and Gray code 
hopping techniques are presented that may be implemented individually or concurrently. 
The first technique may be utilized in any multiple-input multiple-output system with 
choice of single- or multi-space-time code configurations. Orthogonal, non-orthogonal, 
and spatially-multiplexed space-time codes are included to achieve a desired 
diversity-multiplexing balance in addition to demonstrated security benefits. Gray code 
hopping may be used in any system with common digital modulation schemes to “hop” 
between alternative binary reflected Gray code mappings of bits to complex-valued 
modulation symbols. Unlike similar constellation remapping techniques, Gray code 
hopping provides improved physical layer security against plaintext attacks without 
sacrificing bit error rate performance. To facilitate these schemes, we present two series 
of algorithms that systematically build large sets of unique alternative space-time codes 
and modulation mappings. Decoding methods are discussed to allow for channel 
equalization and symbol co-phasing when employing an alternating space-time code. 
Equivalent modulation/demodulation approaches are provided for Gray code hopping. 
Information-theoretic and computational security analysis, Monte Carlo simulations, and 
over-the-air testing are completed as confirmation of proposed methods. 
v 
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Wireless networks such as Wi-Fi and cellular technologies have become essential and
ubiquitous tools of our everyday life. Maintaining security of the information shared over
those networks is of the utmost importance. Although communications security is often
performed via higher layer cryptography, the expectation that quantum computing may
allow for certain types of cryptography to be rapidly broken has led to a dramatic increase
in physical layer security (PLS) research in recent years to provide for a more holistic
approach of “layered security” [1]–[3]. Further impetus for PLS research is found with its
intended use in emergent 5th generation (5G) cellular networks [4]–[7].
To begin this chapter, we review some common approaches toward PLS from the literature to
provide a better understanding of the solution space identified for contributions by this work.
We then define the objectives of our research and provide a summary of the organization of
this dissertation.
The contents of this dissertation have been revised from previous work already published or
in publication by the author. Specifically, portions of Sections 2.1, 2.2.3, 5.1.4, and 5.2.2 are
revised from “Orthogonal STBC Set Building and Physical Layer Security Application” by
Michael Cribbs, Ric Romero, and Tri Ha published in 2020 IEEE 21st International Work-
shop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless Communications (SPAWC) in May 2020
©2020 IEEE1 [8]. Portions of Sections 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 7.1
and Appendices A and B are revised from “Physical Layer Security for Multiple-Input
Multiple-Output Systems by Alternating Orthogonal Space-Time Block Codes” by Michael
Cribbs, Ric Romero, and Tri Ha published in IEEE Open Journal of the Communications
Society in September 2020, used under CC BY [9]. Portions of Sections 2.1, 3.2, 5.1, 5.2,
1In reference to IEEE copyrighted material which is used with permission in this dissertation, the IEEE
does not endorse any of Naval Postgraduate School’s products or services. Internal or personal use of this
material is permitted. If interested in reprinting/republishing IEEE copyrighted material for advertising or
promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution, please go to http:
//www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/rights_link.html to learn how to obtain a License
from RightsLink. If applicable, University Microfilms and/or ProQuest Library, or the Archives of Canada
may supply single copies of the dissertation.
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6.1.1, and 7.1 and Appendices A and B are revised from “Alternative Codes and Phase
Rotation Extensions for Alternating Space-Time Coding-Based Physical Layer Security” by
Michael Cribbs, Ric Romero, and Tri Ha accepted for publication in IEEE Open Journal of
the Communications Society, used under CC BY [10]. Portions of Sections 1.1.2, 2.2, 3.4,
5.3, 6.3, 6.4, and 7.1 are revised from “Modulation-Based Physical Layer Security via Gray
Code Hopping” by Michael Cribbs, Ric Romero, and Tri Ha accepted for publication in
35th IEEE International Workshop Technical Committee on Communications Quality and
Reliability ©2021 IEEE1 [11].
1.1 Literature Review
Although security in wireless networks covers many areas, including authentication, non-
repudiation, confidentiality and access control, and integrity and availability [12], the focus
of our research is data confidentiality. Broadly speaking, techniques aiming to provide confi-
dentiality can be divided into two groups: information-theoretic security and computational
security [7]. Information-theoretic security is generally understood to rely on properties of
the physical channel between transmitter and intended receiver and is based on Shannon’s
mathematical theory of communications [7], [13]. It is often based on the assumption that
these properties are unknown to an eavesdropper, colloquially referred to as “Eve,” and/or
their effects cannot be undone by Eve. On the other hand, computational security is based
on the amount of effort or time required to break a code [1], [7], [14].
PLS solutions have traditionally been viewed as purely information-theoretic security ap-
proaches [5]–[7], [12], [15]; however, through examination of PLS techniques from the
literature, several can be found that incorporate elements of computational security [4],
[16]–[28]. This is considered to be true based on the understanding that computational se-
curity is a component of any communications system where it is possible for Eve to obtain
the transmitted information, with a reasonable error rate, by decoding the system through
enumeration of all values within a countable, albeit extremely large, set of possibilities [1],
[6].
We now review a few PLS approaches from the literature, grouping them by whether they
contain elements of computational security. This distinction is made in light of the fact that
contributions made by this research also incorporate elements of computational security;
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thus, it is desired that the reader is aware that the proposed solution does not stand alone in
this aspect.
1.1.1 Techniques without Elements of Computational Security
In his pioneering work in this area of research, Wyner [29] introduced the wire-tap channel
where secrecy capacity was achieved assuming the signal received over the wire-tap channel
was a degraded version of that received over the main channel. Further research loosened
this assumption to allow for security without such disparity between channels [30]. Many
PLS approaches employ the use of forward error-correcting codes that may be randomized
or punctured to provide security [15], [31]–[33]. Other common approaches over multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) channels include use of precoding matrices or insertion of
artificial noise [34]–[38]. Some of these techniques are now briefly discussed to provide a
background of this vast area of research.
Artificial Noise
In [37], the transmitter estimates the channel state information (CSI) to the intended receiver
and generates an additive artificial noise matrix, w, that lies within the null space of the
receiver’s channel matrix, H𝐴𝐵. The transmitter then sends the original signal, s, plus the
noise matrix, and the receiver obtains
y𝑅 = H𝐴𝐵 (s + w) + n ≈ H𝐴𝐵s + n, (1.1)
where n is an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector. On the other hand, Eve obtains
y𝐸 = H𝐴𝐸 (s + w) + n = H𝐴𝐸s + H𝐴𝐸w + n, (1.2)
where H𝐴𝐸 is Eve’s channel matrix. Thus, addition of artificial noise has little to no impact
on the intended receiver but degrades the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) over Eve’s channel.
Cooperative Jamming
In [39], two entities, commonly known as “Alice” and “Bob,” communicate to one another
simultaneously over a full-duplex MIMO wireless communications link referred to as the
two-way MIMO wire-tap channel, as shown in Fig. 1.1. With knowledge of their own
3
transmission, each entity is able to remove corresponding interference in order to extract
the transmission from the other entity; however, Eve does not have this ability due to the
lack of knowledge of either transmission information. This scheme suffers if either channel
from Alice to Eve or Bob to Eve is sufficiently degraded in relation to the other. This creates
a single-user decodable condition in which the information transmitted over the dominant
channel is received by Eve without interference of the secondary channel.
Figure 1.1. Illustration of two-way MIMO wire-tap channel. Source: [39].
A similar cooperative jamming technique was presented in [40] for a different type of
two-way wire-tap channel.
Precoding and Beamforming Methods
Several methods employ CSI at the transmitter or a handshaking procedure to establish
precoding matrices or beamforming vectors that optimize reception at only the intended
receiver [2], [36], [41], [42]. One system utilizing a precoding matrix in this manner is
shown in Fig. 1.2.
The handshaking procedure is sometimes employed to come to an agreement regarding
the best suboptimal precoding matrix index (PMI) for use from a codebook rather than
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Figure 1.2. Illustration of using precoding matrix to optimize reception at
only the intended receiver. Source: [36].
requiring performance of singular value decomposition to obtain the optimal precoding
matrix solution. In [2], this handshaking procedure is exploited to establish a quantum
secure shared secret key.
Error-Correcting Codes
Error-correcting codes such as the low density parity check (LDPC) and Polar codes have
received extensive use in PLS schemes [15], [31]–[33]. These methods generally rely on
the original assumption made by Wyner that the wire-tap channel is degraded more than the
primary channel; thus, errors may be intentionally inserted by the transmitter and corrected
only by the intended receiver. In [32], secret information was transferred from transmitter
to receiver within the punctured bits of an LDPC code and not actually transmitted over
the channel at all. Channel conditions were assumed such that Eve could not recover the
punctured bits.
1.1.2 Techniques with Elements of Computational Security
There are a number of techniques that aim to achieve PLS via randomizations, rotations,
or other modifications to either the complex-valued symbols or bit-to-symbol mappings
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associated with standard digital modulation schemes. Other approaches apply phase rota-
tions (PRs) to traditional space-time (ST) codes (STCs) or randomization of orthogonal
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) subcarrier assignments. We now provide a brief
description of these approaches including elements of computational security.
Constellation Remapping
A technique was presented in [16] to remap an 𝑀-ary quadrature amplitude modulation
(MQAM) constellation using a process called mirror-mapped encoding that rearranges a
“Gray code sequence by mirroring the arrangement of subsequences” [16]. This technique
between the transmitter and receiver, referred to as the base station (BS) and user equipment
(UE) from this point forward, starts by determining the CSI of the mutual channel between
them. A quantization of the phase of the determined CSI is used to create a vector, C, of
𝑏-bits, where 𝑏 = log2(𝑀) is the number of bits represented by each of the 𝑀 symbols in
the MQAM scheme. This vector is then employed by the mirror-mapped encoding process
to create a minimum distance mapping of the MQAM constellation from nested quaternary
or quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK) constellations [16].




𝑋 (𝑖) , (1.3)
where
𝑋 (𝑖) = 2𝑏/2−𝑖
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𝑋 is a complex-valued modulation symbol, 𝑋 (𝑖) represents scaled QPSK symbols summed
together to produce 𝑋 , and B is the 𝑏-bit message, aka binary label, corresponding to 𝑋 [16].
Applying this technique for all possible phase angles of CSI produces a subset of alternative
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binary reflected Gray code (BRGC) mappings of size 2𝑏. Within this subset, there is only a
single mapping that pairs each constellation symbol with each binary label; therefore, Eve
can determine the entire mapping with only a single symbol of known plaintext (PT) data.
Without mention of a constellation remapping frequency within [16], it is assumed that
the same mapping is used throughout a communications session; thus, an attack employing
only a single symbol of known PT would allow Eve to decode an entire communications
session.
A similar technique called channel-based mapping diversity (CBMD) was proposed in
[17] for remapping 𝑀-ary phase-shift keying (MPSK) constellations with Gray coding
constraints by employing channel gains as the shared secret between BS and UE. As in [16],
only a subset of alternative BRGC mappings is used in [17], and the remapping frequency
is also not clearly stated. It is assumed that the same mapping is employed for numerous
data symbols within a communications session leaving this technique equally vulnerable to
a known PT attack.
In [18], a PLS technique called CD-PHY was presented based on what was called con-
stellation diversity. The basic idea of CD-PHY is that BS and UE employ a secret random
mapping of the constellation symbols to bit sequences. It was stated in [18] that the eaves-
dropper would have to attempt all 𝑀! mappings to find the correct decoding; thus, CD-PHY
allows for any mapping to be employed without requiring that binary labels with a Ham-
ming distance of 1 be mapped to symbols separated by the minimum distance within the
constellation. As [43] confirmed the optimality of BRGC mappings for common signal
constellations, CD-PHY results in degraded bit error rate (BER) performance between BS
and UE when a mapping other than a BRGC mapping is selected. Additionally, [18] did not
mention how frequently the secret random mapping would be updated; thus, it is assumed
that the same mapping is used throughout a communications session.
Another scheme referred to as constellation mapping obfuscation (CMO) was presented
in [19] that likewise allowed for any of the 𝑀! mappings to be employed between BS and
UE as shown in Fig. 1.3. Thus, implementation of CMO will also lead to degraded BER
performance.
As all 𝑀! mappings are permitted by these two schemes, there are (𝑀 − 1)! mappings that
pair each symbol with each binary label. Thus, a known PT attack including 𝑛 ≤ 𝑀 unique
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Figure 1.3. Illustration of CMO. Source: [19].
constellation symbols reduces the uncertainty of the static secret mapping to (𝑀 − 𝑛)!
possibilities corresponding to all mappings that pair the 𝑛 received symbols with the corre-
sponding 𝑛 known PT binary labels.
Even without known PT data, all constellation remapping techniques presented utilize a
countable set of possible mappings and thereby an element of computational security.
Constellation Selection and Artificial Interference
In [20], a scheme called constellation selection and artificial interference for eavesdropping
suppression (CSAI-ES) was presented whereby a set of modulation modes (e.g., QPSK,
16QAM, 64QAM) and constellation structures (e.g., circular or rectangular) is employed
along with artificial interference to enhance PLS. The network model given in [20] and
shown in Fig. 1.4 is representative of a common technique of employing artificial noise
or interference to degrade Eve’s channel; however, adding interference may also degrade
the BER performance between BS and UE up to a pre-determined threshold [20]. This
technique did not choose to add interference within the null space of UE’s channel matrix
as discussed in [37].
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Figure 1.4. Illustration of common physical layer network model with addition
of artificial interference. Source: [20].
A mechanism was proposed in [20] for BS to inform UE of the chosen modulation mode
and structure prior to transmission. Without any mention of repetition frequency for this
mechanism, it is assumed that the same mode and structure are used throughout a com-
munications session. Modulation identification techniques could likely be used by Eve to
determine the mode and structure in use [44]; however, with only a limited set of possi-
bilities, Eve could also enumerate all possible modes and structures to break this scheme.
Although the addition of artificial interference will result in degraded performance, Eve
may decode an entire communications session once the static mode and structure in use
have been determined.
Constellation Rotation
A technique referred to as original symbol phase rotated (OSPR) secure transmission was
introduced in [4] whereby the symbols transmitted by a massive MIMO BS to 𝐾 legitimate
user terminals (UTs) are phase-rotated by an amount equal to the angle of one channel tap
estimate for each UT. It was shown how a broadcast reference signal could be transmitted
by the BS to each UT in order to disseminate the secret PR angle without giving that
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information away to a passive eavesdropper. It was discussed that the reference signal
could be rebroadcast to enhance secrecy performance [4]; however, this obviously results
in increased overhead unless the reference signal is also required for other purposes.
Using OSPR leads to eavesdropper uncertainty between equal energy symbols within the
chosen constellation; however, no inherent uncertainty exists between constellation points
of different energies other than that of channel noise. Additionally, all symbols for a given
UT are rotated the same amount until the reference signal broadcasting step is repeated;
thus, a single symbol of known PT would allow Eve to decode an entire communications
session between repetitions of the reference signal broadcast step. Without PT data, Eve
could also break this scheme through enumeration as a finite alphabet of symbols exists
within any chosen modulation scheme, and even fewer symbols have equal energy. Thus,
only a relatively small number of PRs would need to be attempted to obtain the correct
output data frame.
Constellation Rotation and Amplitude Randomization
In [21], an independent pseudorandom PR was applied to each transmitted symbol in
a time-domain synchronous OFDM (TDS-OFDM) system. The symbol-specific rotation
angle was generated by a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). A weak artificial noise
signal was subsequently added to further degrade the performance of the eavesdropper’s
channel. Later, a technique was developed based on [21] where a more detailed amplitude
randomization algorithm was devised to reduce the ability for Eve to identify the modulation
scheme in use [22]. Although QPSK performance provided in [22] indicated insignificant
BER performance degradation between BS and UE, similar results for MQAM were not
provided.
Similar to OSPR, this scheme leads to eavesdropper uncertainty between equal energy
symbols within the chosen constellation; however, due to the addition of artificial noise,
this scheme also introduces uncertainty to both Eve and UE regarding symbols within
neighboring energy levels. It is suspected that BER performance between BS and UE
would be degraded for higher-order MQAM schemes using this technique due to this added
uncertainty.
Unlike the schemes previously discussed, any known PT would only allow Eve to determine
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the PR applied to the corresponding symbols. It is assumed in [21] that details of the PRNG
implementation are unknown to Eve; thus, Eve is unable to determine the rotation applied
to symbols before or after the known PT portion of the transmission. If Eve is able to
gather some information about the PRNG with exception of the state at the beginning of
transmission, Eve could attempt to break this scheme by enumerating the state space of
the PRNG. Whereas this enumeration is likely a larger task than with previous techniques,
the state space is still countable; thus, with sufficient time and computational effort, this
scheme may be broken with slightly reduced BER performance due to the weak artificial
noise insertion.
Constellation Rotation and Subcarrier Randomization
In [27], a pseudorandom chaos sequence was employed to phase-rotate modulation symbols
and provide a chaos mapping of OFDM subcarriers as shown in Fig. 1.5. Computational
security was evaluated within [27] stating that the number of possible secret keys for the
proposed scheme was 1.8 ·1039, which translates to approximately 131 bit security by taking
the base two logarithm of the number of possible keys.
Figure 1.5. Illustration of a secure OFDM transmission scheme based on
chaos mapping. Source: [27].
A revised version of this scheme was presented in [45] that also allowed for modulation
amplitude randomization. This revision increased the number of possible keys to 1.5 · 1098,
or 327 bit security, but incurred a cost in BER performance.
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Space-Time Coding Schemes
In [25], a technique named “hidden OSTBC” was introduced where a pre-shared secret
pseudorandom antipodal sequence was applied across the transmit (TX) antennas of a
MIMO system after encoding with a STC as shown in Fig. 1.6. The primary STC considered
in [25] is a rate 1 real-valued orthogonal STC represented as
G =

+𝑠1 +𝑠2 +𝑠3 +𝑠4 +𝑠5 +𝑠6 +𝑠7 +𝑠8
−𝑠2 +𝑠1 +𝑠4 −𝑠3 +𝑠6 −𝑠5 −𝑠8 +𝑠7
−𝑠3 −𝑠4 +𝑠1 +𝑠2 +𝑠7 +𝑠8 −𝑠5 −𝑠6
−𝑠4 +𝑠3 −𝑠2 +𝑠1 +𝑠8 −𝑠7 +𝑠6 −𝑠5
−𝑠5 −𝑠6 −𝑠7 −𝑠8 +𝑠1 +𝑠2 +𝑠3 +𝑠4
−𝑠6 +𝑠5 −𝑠8 +𝑠7 −𝑠2 +𝑠1 −𝑠4 +𝑠3
−𝑠7 +𝑠8 +𝑠5 −𝑠6 −𝑠3 +𝑠4 +𝑠1 −𝑠2
−𝑠8 −𝑠7 +𝑠6 +𝑠5 −𝑠4 −𝑠3 +𝑠2 +𝑠1

, (1.7)
using eight TX antennas to transmit eight data symbols, 𝑠1 through 𝑠8, over eight symbol time
periods. A few extensions of this STC were offered up to a rate 1/8 real-valued orthogonal
STC using 64 TX antennas to transmit eight data symbols over 64 symbol time periods.
It was stated in [25] that the same pseudorandom sequence could be used for multiple
transmissions; thus, this technique is considered to employ a static STC throughout the
entire communications session.
In [26], the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) was used as a secret key to seed a
PRNG used to generate PRs to be applied to each TX antenna of a MIMO system after
encoding with either the Alamouti STC from [46] or the 3/4 rate Octonion orthogonal STC
from [47]. Unlike in [25], the PRs produced by this scheme change after every codeword,
or one-time usage of the STC.
Whereas both of these schemes apply a unit-energy rotation to the TX antenna data streams
after encoding with a standard STC, neither approach performs this same operation across
symbol time periods or data symbols themselves. Likewise, neither technique applies any
permutation or conjugation to the data streams, time periods, or data symbols. In terms
of computational security, Eve could attempt to enumerate the state space of the PRNG
employed within [26] to break this approach, as previously discussed with the [21] scheme.
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Figure 1.6. Illustration of applying a pseudorandom antipodal sequence to
the TX antennas of a MIMO system. Source: [25].
Since the antipodal sequence employed by [25] is static throughout a communications
session, Eve could enumerate the possible antipodal sequences to break this scheme.
1.2 Objectives
Based on our literature review, we found that no existing constellation remapping approach
utilizes all alternative BRGC mappings to maximize the uncertainty of an eavesdropper
while maintaining the BER performance of the intended receiver. Additionally, none of the
ST coding-based PLS schemes make use of all available degrees of freedom within the STC
structure to maximize security. With the solution space identified for contribution, we now
state our objectives.
The primary objective for our research is to develop a tailorable PLS framework including
optional techniques designed to alternate the STC and/or modulation mapping in use over
a wireless communications link. To that end, details of these techniques are investigated
including
• various types of STCs and digital modulation schemes,
• algorithms to build alternative STCs and mappings,
• single- versus multi-STC alternation methods,
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• information-theoretic security offered in terms of message and key equivocation and
mutual information,
• and computational security offered.
Monte Carlo simulations and over-the-air (OTA) testing are completed as confirmation of
the proposed methods.
1.3 Organization
Due to the optimality of BRGC mappings for common signal constellations as confirmed
in [43], all modulation schemes evaluated employ BRGC mappings of bits to complex-
valued symbols. Alternating between these various mappings with consecutive modulation
symbols is referred to as Gray code hopping (GCH) from this point forward.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, base STCs and
mappings are presented along with operation descriptions and algorithms to systemati-
cally build large sets of unique alternative STCs and modulation mappings. In Chapter 3,
transmission and reception support methods are provided to facilitate alternating STCs and
GCH. In Chapter 4, the alternating STC and GCH PLS schemes are proposed. In Chapter 5,
nomenclature is provided to allow for characterization of ST coding-based PLS schemes.
Security offered by the proposed techniques when employed individually and in unison
is then discussed. In Chapter 6, results of Monte Carlo simulations and OTA testing are
provided. Finally, in Chapter 7, significant contributions made by this work are discussed




In order to develop techniques to alternate the STC in use and/or perform GCH over a
wireless communications link, we must identify alternative STCs and Gray code mappings.
To begin this task, we briefly discuss common STCs and modulation constellations. We
then examine operations that may be performed to construct alternatives. Finally, we present
a series of algorithms that systematically implement these operations to build large sets of
unique alternative STCs and modulation mappings. These tasks are completed for STCs
first and then for bit to complex-valued symbol mappings.
This chapter includes adaptations from previous work already published or in publication
by the author. Specifically, portions of Section 2.1 are revised from [8]–[10]. Portions of
Section 2.2 are revised from [8] and [11].
2.1 Space-Time Code Sets
Before presenting STC sets, we first establish common terminology and symbols. A STC
matrix is represented as G. For all STCs, let 𝑐 represent the number of columns in G. This
also represents the number of TX antennas employed as each column is a TX antenna data
stream. Likewise, 𝑟 is used to represent the number of rows in G, which also represents the
number of symbol time periods. The number of symbols per codeword is represented by
𝑘 , where codeword refers to a single block of encoded symbols as dictated by the chosen
STC matrix. The data symbol vector for any given STC refers to s = [𝑠1 . . . 𝑠𝑘 ]𝑇 , where
𝑇 represents the transpose operation. An extended data symbol vector, s𝑒𝑥𝑡 = [s𝑇 s†]𝑇 , is
also referenced, where † represents conjugate transpose operation. These definitions remain
consistent throughout this dissertation.
2.1.1 Base Space-Time Codes
Three different types of base STCs are investigated for use with this research: orthogonal,
non-orthogonal, and spatially-multiplexed (SM) STCs. We now present base STCs from
each of these three types.
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Orthogonal Space-Time Codes
The first type of STC investigated is the orthogonal STC. This type employs transmit
diversity and exhibits orthogonality between each TX antenna data stream. The Alamouti









using two TX antennas to transmit two data symbols, 𝑠1 and 𝑠2, over two symbol time
periods [46]. The asterisk, (*), represents complex conjugate operation.
The base code employed in [8], referred to as single-pair orthogonal 3-3-4 (SPO334), is a















using three TX antennas to transmit three data symbols, 𝑠1 through 𝑠3, over four symbol
time periods.
The base code employed in [9], referred to as multi-pair orthogonal 4-6-8 (MPO468), is a
complex rate 6/8 orthogonal STC represented as
G =























using four TX antennas to transmit six data symbols, 𝑠1 through 𝑠6, over eight symbol
time periods. MPO468 is based on a STC constructed in [48] but reordered to show how
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it extends SPO334. Although the code rate of these two STCs is equivalent, the additional
columns, data symbols, and rows in MPO468 allows for a much larger set cardinality.
An alternative code, referred to as multi-pair orthogonal 3-3-4 (MPO334), is a complex rate





























using three TX antennas to transmit three data symbols, 𝑠1 through 𝑠3, over four symbol
time periods.
A variation of MPO334, referred to as multi-pair orthogonal 4-3-4 (MPO434), is a complex









































using four TX antennas to transmit three data symbols, 𝑠1 through 𝑠3, over four symbol
time periods. MPO334 and MPO434 were designed using the theory of amicable designs
from [49] and originally referred to as sporadic 3/4 rate STCs when given in [50].
A slight modification in representation is required for both MPO334 and MPO434 in order
to use the set building algorithms that follow. These STCs must be translated into three-
dimensional matrices that are subsequently summed along the third dimension to return to
the original forms given in (2.4) and (2.5) prior to transmission. By translating each matrix
into three dimensions, each element of the resulting matrix contains only a single weighted
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data symbol variation. This representation allows for the same set building algorithms to be
used with any base STC discussed.
As MPO334 and MPO434 contain matrix elements with sums of four symbol variations,
the third-dimension depth, denoted as 𝑑 from this point forward, for the resulting matrices
is four. Thus, MPO334 is translated into a three-dimensional matrix with slices of






























































The second type of STC investigated is the non-orthogonal STC. Although this type also
employs transmit diversity, not all antenna data streams are orthogonal. The one and only
non-orthogonal base STC researched is referred to as non-orthogonal 4-4-2 (NO442). It is
a complex rate 2 non-orthogonal STC introduced in [51] represented as
G =
[










using four TX antennas to transmit four data symbols, 𝑠1 through 𝑠4, over two symbol time
periods.
Spatially-Multiplexed Space-Time Codes
The last type of STC investigated is the SM STC (SMSTC). This type maximizes use of
spatial multiplexing and does not employ transmit diversity. For all SMSTCs, data symbols
are inserted into every STC matrix element without repetition. The first base STC of this






using two TX antennas to transmit two data symbols, 𝑠1 and 𝑠2, over one symbol time
period.




𝑠1 𝑠2 𝑠3 𝑠4
]
, (2.12)
using four TX antennas to transmit four data symbols, 𝑠1 through 𝑠4, over one symbol time
period.
2.1.2 Alternative Code Operations
To construct an alternative STC from a given base code, operations must be applied in a way
that maintains the properties of the original code. Thus, if the base code is orthogonal, the
alternative STC is also orthogonal. The operations researched to obtain alternative STCs
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include PRs, permutations, and conjugations. We now discuss each of these operations.
Phase Rotations
All base codes discussed in Section 2.1.1 contain complex-valued symbols. All elements
within chosen rows and/or columns of these base codes may be phase-rotated by various
amounts to produce alternative STCs. These operations are referred to as row and column
PRs, respectively. Additionally, for those base codes exhibiting transmit diversity, all variants
of a chosen data symbol may be phase-rotated to obtain an alternative code. This is referred
to as a symbol PR. There are a few details that must be considered when performing PR
operations.
Selection of allowed PR angles must first be determined. For the purpose of simplicity, we
propose a PR scheme with selection of equally-spaced PR angles around the complex-plane.
In order to do this, we define a variable 𝑎 ≥ 1 such that 2𝑎 equally-spaced PR angles are




radians, where 𝑥 ∈ {0, . . . , 2𝑎 − 1} is the PR angle index. When 𝑎 = 1, this PR scheme is
equivalent to negation as only 0 and 𝜋 radian PRs are allowed in this case.
When performing symbol PRs, it must be understood that orthogonal STC matrices consist
of conjugated and unconjugated symbol variations. In order to maintain orthogonality
while performing symbol PRs, these dissimilarly-conjugated symbol variations must receive
opposing PRs. Without loss of generality, if unconjugated variations of a given data symbol
are rotated by 𝜙 radians, conjugated variations of that same data symbol must be rotated by
−𝜙 radians.
Permutations
Rows, columns, and symbols may also be permuted to build alternative STCs. As a reminder
of the standard structure for STC matrices, rows within the STC matrix represent symbol
time periods; thus, row permutations are a simple reordering of the symbol time periods.
Likewise, column permutations are a reordering of the TX antenna data streams. Symbol
permutations involve switching all variations of a given data symbol for the same variations
of a different data symbol according to a selected permutation vector.
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Example 2.1.1. A symbol-permuted version of (2.3) is given as
G =























which is built by swapping symbols 𝑠5 and 𝑠6 (i.e., permutation vector of [1 2 3 4 6 5]).
Conjugations
All variants of a chosen data symbol may be conjugated to produce an alternative STC. Row
and column conjugations are not performed as they generally do not maintain orthogonality
of antenna data streams. There are select combinations of row and column conjugations
that do maintain orthogonality; however, these combinations can be seen as equivalent to
performing a particular combination of symbol conjugations. Thus, this operation is limited
to symbol conjugations alone.
2.1.3 Space-Time Code Set Building Algorithms
Operations from the previous section are now implemented in a systematic manner to
build a set, S𝑠, of unique alternative STCs from a given base code from Section 2.1.1.
Algorithms S0 - S7 are provided in this section for this purpose. Algorithm S0 is performed
first to initialize the set. Algorithms S1 - S7 are then performed in any order. Depending
on the chosen base code, applicable operation limits must be applied to prevent duplicate
codes from being built.
Algorithm Notes
Values of 𝑐, 𝑘 , 𝑟, and 𝑑 for the chosen STC are known to all algorithms in this dissertation. If
a two dimensional STC is employed, then 𝑑 = 1. All text within curly brackets are comments
21
Algorithm S0 - STC Set Initialization
Inputs: G {Base STC},
S𝑠 {STC set cardinality},
K𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚 {Symbol permutation of base STC}
Outputs: S𝑠 {Set of STCs}, 𝑃𝐶𝑜 {# of populated codes in output S𝑠},
A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 {Symbols record array}
1: 𝑃𝐶𝑜 = 1
2: S𝑠 = 4-dimensional array of 0’s of size 𝑟-by-𝑐-by-𝑑-by-
S𝑠
3: S𝑠 (: , : , : , 1) = G {Populate set index 1 with Base STC}
4: for 𝑚𝑖 = 1 to
S𝑠 do
5: A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 (𝑚𝑖, :) = K𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚 {Initialize each row of A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 with K𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚}
6: end for
7: return S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑜, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠
to aid the reader. The 𝑑𝑒2𝑏𝑖(𝑖, 𝑛, 𝑝) MATLAB function is used to create a length 𝑛, little-
endian (aka right most significant digit) row vector of the decimal value 𝑖 represented in
base 𝑝 [52]. The 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(v) MATLAB function is used to create a square diagonal matrix with
elements of vector v on the main diagonal [53]. Length of any given vector v is represented
as |v|. A slightly modified version of the 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠(𝑛) MATLAB function is used to create an
𝑛!-by-𝑛 array containing all permutations of the integers from 1 to 𝑛 in lexicographic order,
where each row contains a different permutation [54]. The [B, I] = 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 (A) MATLAB
function is used to sort the elements of vector A in ascending order, where B holds the
sorted elements, and I holds the original indices of the elements of A as they appear within
B such that B = A(I) [55]. The ∼ symbol in place of B indicates that B is not used. Lastly,
× is used to indicate matrix multiplication whereas ◦ indicates element-wise multiplication,
and == indicates logically equal whereas = indicates assignment.
Operation Limits
For all base STCs given in Section 2.1.1 with the exception of SMSTCs, the operation limits
for row PRs, column PRs, and row permutations are consistent. All 2𝑎𝑟 combinations of
row PRs are permitted, and all 𝑟! row permutations are permitted. Column PRs are limited
to 2𝑎(𝑐−1) to prevent building duplicate codes within the set.
The operation limit for the symbol PR algorithm is dependent on the base code selected. An
allowed symbol PRs vector (v𝑎𝑠𝑟) is used for this purpose within the symbol PR algorithm.
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Algorithm S1 - Row Phase Rotations
Inputs: S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑖 {# of populated codes in input S𝑠}, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠
Outputs: S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑜, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠
1: 𝑃𝐶𝑜 = 𝑃𝐶𝑖 · 2𝑎𝑟 {Operation limit = 2𝑎𝑟}
2: for 𝑖𝑡 = 1 to 2𝑎𝑟 − 1 do
3: v𝑟𝑜𝑤 = 𝑑𝑒2𝑏𝑖(𝑖𝑡, 𝑟, 2𝑎) {Row PR vector}
4: In v𝑟𝑜𝑤, replace each element, 𝑥, with 𝑒 𝑗2𝜋𝑥/2
𝑎
5: T𝑟𝑜𝑤 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(v𝑟𝑜𝑤)
6: for 𝑚𝑖 = 1 to 𝑃𝐶𝑖 do
7: A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 (𝑃𝐶𝑖 · 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖, :) = A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 (𝑚𝑖, :) {Update symbols record array}
8: for 𝑑𝑖 = 1 to 𝑑 do




13: return S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑜, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠
Although all 𝑐! column permutations are permitted for the majority of STCs investigated,
similarity of particular columns within MPO334 and MPO434 requires the column permu-
tations algorithm to be limited to prevent duplicate codes. For the MPO334 STC, column
permutations that are similar to a previously allowed permutation but with only the first
and second columns swapped are not permitted. For the MPO434 STC, column permu-
tations that are similar to a previously allowed permutation but with only the first and
second columns swapped and/or third and fourth columns swapped are not permitted. Due
to this fact, an allowed column permutations vector (v𝑎𝑐𝑝) is employed within the column
permutations algorithm.
Example 2.1.2. The full permutations array for a vector with three elements is shown
in Fig. 2.1 using the modified 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠(𝑛) MATLAB function as previously described [54].
Using Fig. 2.1 as a reference since 𝑐 = 3 for the MPO334 STC, only permutation indices one,
two, and five are permitted (i.e., v𝑎𝑐𝑝 = [1 2 5]). This is determined as permutation three
is similar to permutation one with only the first and second columns swapped. Likewise,
permutation four is similar to permutation two, and permutation six is similar to permutation
five.
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Algorithm S2 - Column Phase Rotations
Inputs: S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑖, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠
Outputs: S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑜, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠
1: 𝑃𝐶𝑜 = 𝑃𝐶𝑖 · 2𝑎(𝑐−1) {Operation limit = 2𝑎(𝑐−1)}
2: for 𝑖𝑡 = 1 to 2𝑎(𝑐−1) − 1 do
3: v𝑐𝑜𝑙 = 𝑑𝑒2𝑏𝑖(𝑖𝑡, 𝑐, 2𝑎) {Column PR vector}
4: In v𝑐𝑜𝑙 , replace each element, 𝑥, with 𝑒 𝑗2𝜋𝑥/2
𝑎
5: T𝑐𝑜𝑙 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(v𝑐𝑜𝑙)
6: for 𝑚𝑖 = 1 to 𝑃𝐶𝑖 do
7: A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 (𝑃𝐶𝑖 · 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖, :) = A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 (𝑚𝑖, :) {Update symbols record array}
8: for 𝑑𝑖 = 1 to 𝑑 do




13: return S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑜, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠

Permutation Index
1 1 2 3
2 1 3 2
3 2 1 3
4 2 3 1
5 3 1 2
6 3 2 1

Figure 2.1. Full permutations array for a vector with three elements.
Symbol permutations are not required for all STCs. Row and column permutations are
sufficient for the Alamouti and SPO334 STCs due to the rows and columns of G in (2.1) and
(2.2) containing all possible combinations of data symbols for those codes. For all other STCs
investigated, symbol permutations are required to provide all possible symbol combinations;
however, not all symbol permutations are permitted in order to ensure uniqueness of codes
within the set. An allowed symbol permutations vector (v𝑎𝑠𝑝) is used for this purpose within
the symbol permutations algorithm. For most base codes, v𝑎𝑠𝑝 is empirically derived by
performing each of the 𝑘! symbol permutations in lexicographic order and recording the






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Algorithm S4 - Row Permutations
Inputs: S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑖, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠
Outputs: S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑜, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠
1: 𝑃𝐶𝑜 = 𝑃𝐶𝑖 · 𝑟! {Operation limit = 𝑟!}
2: R𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 = 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠(𝑟) {Row permutations array}
3: for 𝑖𝑡 = 1 to 𝑟! − 1 do
4: for 𝑚𝑖 = 1 to 𝑃𝐶𝑖 do
5: A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 (𝑃𝐶𝑖 · 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖, :) = A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 (𝑚𝑖, :) {Update symbols record array}
6: S𝑠 (: , : , : , 𝑃𝐶𝑖 · 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖) = S𝑠 (R𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 (𝑖𝑡 + 1, :), : , : , 𝑚𝑖)
7: end for
8: end for
9: return S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑜, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠
Algorithm S5 - Column Permutations
Inputs: S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑖, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠, v𝑎𝑐𝑝 {Allowed column permutations vector}
Outputs: S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑜, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠
1: 𝑃𝐶𝑜 = 𝑃𝐶𝑖 · |v𝑎𝑐𝑝 | {Operation limit = |v𝑎𝑐𝑝 |}
2: C𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 = 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠(𝑐) {Column permutations array}
3: for 𝑖𝑡 = 1 to |v𝑎𝑐𝑝 | − 1 do
4: for 𝑚𝑖 = 1 to 𝑃𝐶𝑖 do
5: A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 (𝑃𝐶𝑖 · 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖, :) = A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 (𝑚𝑖, :) {Update symbols record array}
6: S𝑠 (: , : , : , 𝑃𝐶𝑖 · 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖) = S𝑠 (: ,C𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 (v𝑎𝑐𝑝 (𝑖𝑡 + 1), :), : , 𝑚𝑖)
7: end for
8: end for
9: return S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑜, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠
column, of G.
Example 2.1.3. For the MPO468 STC, v𝑎𝑠𝑝 is empirically determined to be
v𝑎𝑠𝑝 = [1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 13 15 31 32 37] . (2.15)
Whereas 15 allowed symbol permutations, including the original, are recorded in (2.15), it
can be shown that there are 𝑘!/15 − 1 = 720/15 − 1 = 47 other permutations for each of





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Algorithm S7 - Symbol Conjugations
Inputs: S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑖, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠, v𝑎𝑠𝑐 {Allowed symbol conjugations vector}, s𝑒𝑥𝑡
Outputs: S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑜, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠
1: 𝑃𝐶𝑜 = 𝑃𝐶𝑖 · 2|v𝑎𝑠𝑐 | {Operation limit = 2|v𝑎𝑠𝑐 |}
2: for 𝑖𝑡 = 1 to 2|v𝑎𝑠𝑐 | − 1 do
3: v𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 𝑑𝑒2𝑏𝑖(𝑖𝑡, |v𝑎𝑠𝑐 |, 2) {Symbol conjugation vector}
4: for 𝑚𝑖 = 1 to 𝑃𝐶𝑖 do
5: S𝑠 (: , : , : , 𝑃𝐶𝑖 · 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖) = S𝑠 (: , : , : , 𝑚𝑖) {Initialize STC}
6: A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 (𝑃𝐶𝑖 · 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖, :) = A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 (𝑚𝑖, :) {Update symbols record array}
7: v𝑝𝑠𝑐 = A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 (𝑚𝑖, v𝑎𝑠𝑐) {Permuted allowed symbol conjugations vector}
8: v𝑐𝑠𝑐 = vector of 0’s of size 1-by-𝑘
{Current iteration full-length symbol conjugation vector}
9: v𝑐𝑠𝑐 (v𝑝𝑠𝑐) = v𝑠𝑦𝑚 {Insert v𝑠𝑦𝑚 into v𝑐𝑠𝑐 in permuted locations}
10: for 𝑑𝑖 = 1 to 𝑑 do
11: for 𝑟𝑖 = 1 to 𝑟 do
12: for 𝑐𝑖 = 1 to 𝑐 do
13: if S𝑠 (𝑟𝑖, 𝑐𝑖, 𝑑𝑖, 𝑚𝑖) ≠ 0 then
14: 𝑘𝑖 = symbol index of S𝑠 (𝑟𝑖, 𝑐𝑖, 𝑑𝑖, 𝑚𝑖)
{e.g., 𝑘𝑖 = 1 for S𝑠 (𝑟𝑖, 𝑐𝑖, 𝑑𝑖, 𝑚𝑖) == 𝑠1}
15: if v𝑐𝑠𝑐 (𝑘𝑖) ≠ 0 then
16: 𝑤 = positive weight applied to S𝑠 (𝑟𝑖, 𝑐𝑖, 𝑑𝑖, 𝑚𝑖)
{e.g., 𝑤 = 1√
2




17: 𝜙 = PR angle applied to S𝑠 (𝑟𝑖, 𝑐𝑖, 𝑑𝑖, 𝑚𝑖)




18: if S𝑠 (𝑟𝑖, 𝑐𝑖, 𝑑𝑖, 𝑚𝑖) is conjugated then
19: 𝑔 = 0
20: else
21: 𝑔 = 1
22: end if








31: return S𝑠, 𝑃𝐶𝑜, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠
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For the MPO334 and MPO434 codes, v𝑎𝑠𝑝 is derived by determining the first of each set of
permutations that yields a new combination of symbol weights.
Example 2.1.4. For both MPO334 and MPO434, v𝑎𝑠𝑝 is empirically determined to be
v𝑎𝑠𝑝 = [1 2 6] . (2.16)
Elements within v𝑎𝑠𝑝 represent allowed permutation indices. Using Fig. 2.1 as a reference
since 𝑘 = 3 for these STCs, it can be seen that elements given in (2.16) allow for the
original symbol permutation (i.e., [1 2 3]), swapping symbols 𝑠2 and 𝑠3 (i.e., [1 3 2]), or
swapping symbols 𝑠1 and 𝑠3 (i.e., [3 2 1]) for MPO334 and MPO434.
All 2𝑘 combinations of symbol conjugations may be performed for the majority of STCs
investigated; however, only the first 2𝑘−1 combinations are permitted for the Alamouti and
NO442 STCs to prevent building duplicate codes. Thus, an allowed symbol conjugations
vector (v𝑎𝑠𝑐) is used for this purpose within the symbol conjugations algorithm.
For all SMSTCs, data symbols are inserted into every STC matrix element without rep-
etition; thus, 𝑘 is equal to the number of matrix elements. Due to this structure, a set
built using any SMSTC as the base code may be produced using Algorithm S0 along
with Algorithms S3, S6, and S7 alone. Thus, the operation limit for row and column PRs
and permutations is equal to 1 to indicate that these operations are not performed. For
the symbol PRs algorithm, v𝑎𝑠𝑟 = [1 . . . 𝑘]. For the symbol permutations algorithm,
v𝑎𝑠𝑝 = [1 . . . 𝑘!], and for the symbol conjugations algorithm, v𝑎𝑠𝑐 = [1 . . . 𝑘].
The variable vectors employed to provide operation limits for each of the base codes given
in Section 2.1.1 are given in Table 2.1.
Tracking Symbol Permutations
The symbols record array, denoted as A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠, is used for tracking symbol permutations
throughout performance of each algorithm. When the G input to Algorithm S0 is a non-
symbol-permuted version of the original base code for which v𝑎𝑠𝑝 is empirically derived,
then K𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚 = [1 . . . 𝑘] is input to Algorithm S0. For this case, symbol permutation
tracking is only necessary when Algorithm S6 is performed prior to Algorithms S3 or S7.
This serves to permute v𝑎𝑠𝑟 and v𝑎𝑠𝑐 as performed in Algorithms S3 and S7, respectively.
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Table 2.1. Variable vectors for each base STC given in Section 2.1.1.
STC 𝑐 𝑘 𝑟 v𝑎𝑠𝑟 v𝑎𝑐𝑝 v𝑎𝑠𝑝 v𝑎𝑠𝑐
Alamouti 2 2 2 [ ] [1 2] [1] [1]
SPO334 3 3 4 [ ] [1 . . . 6] [1] [1 2 3]
MPO468 4 6 8 [1 2] [1 . . . 24] (2.15) [1 . . . 6]
MPO334 3 3 4 [1] [1 2 5] [1 2 6] [1 2 3]
MPO434 4 3 4 [1] [1 3 4 13 14 17] [1 2 6] [1 2 3]
NO442 4 4 2 [1] [1 . . . 24] [1 3 6] [1 2 3]
SM221 2 2 1 [1 2] [1] [1 2] [1 2]
SM441 4 4 1 [1 2 3 4] [1] [1 . . . 24] [1 2 3 4]
On the contrary, when a symbol-permuted version of the base code is used as the G input
to Algorithm S0, the K𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚 input to Algorithm S0 is vital to properly initialize the symbols
record array. A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 is then used within Algorithm S6 to determine the correct symbol
permutation vector, v𝑘 𝑝, to prevent duplicate codes from being built.
Example 2.1.5. If the symbol-permuted version of the MPO468 STC given in (2.14) is used
as the base code for set building, then K𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚 = [1 2 3 4 6 5] is input to Algorithm S0.
2.1.4 Set Cardinalities
The cardinality of S𝑠, denoted as
S𝑠, including the base code is equal to the product of the
operation limits employed when building the set. For all base STCs given in Section 2.1.1
with the exception of SMSTCs, the set cardinality isS𝑠 = 2(𝑎(𝑟+𝑐+|v𝑎𝑠𝑟 |−1)+|v𝑎𝑠𝑐 |) · 𝑟! · |v𝑎𝑐𝑝 | · |v𝑎𝑠𝑝 |. (2.17)
Since the row and column PR and permutation algorithms are not employed, the cardinality
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of any set built using a SMSTC with 𝑘 data symbols as the base code is given asS𝑠 = 2𝑘 (𝑎+1) · 𝑘!. (2.18)
Cardinality of sets built with each base STC is provided in Table 2.2 for various values of
𝑎.
2.2 Modulation Mapping Sets
We now look at base modulation mappings and methods to produce alternative mappings
from each.
2.2.1 Base Mappings
There are six modulation schemes specified for the 5G New Radio (5G NR) including binary
phase-shift keying (BPSK), 𝜋/2−BPSK, QPSK, 16QAM, 64QAM, and 256QAM [56]. A
modulation mapper function is provided in [56, Section 5.1] for each of these schemes. These
functions represent BRGC mappings from bits to complex-valued modulation symbols. The
BPSK schemes are not utilized for this research. The remaining 5G NR modulation mapper
functions are considered to be baseline mappings.
2.2.2 Alternative Mapping Operations
It was stated in [57] and again in [43] that operations such as bit permutations and inversions
can transform BRGC mappings into alternative mappings exhibiting the same expected
BER. Thus, if a bit permutation or bit inversion, aka exclusive-or (XOR) bit mask, is
uniformly applied to the binary labels of all constellation points, the minimum distance
properties of the original BRGC mapping are preserved.
For a given modulation scheme with 𝑀 symbols and 𝑏 = log2(𝑀) bits per symbol, there
are 𝑏! bit permutations and 2𝑏 bit inversions leading to a total of
2𝑏 · 𝑏! (2.19)






















































































































































































































































































of these alternative mappings, it can be shown that there are 𝑏! mappings that pair each of
the constellation symbols with each of the binary labels.
Table 2.3 provides all equivalent BRGC mappings for the QPSK constellation with 𝑀 = 4
and 𝑏 = 2. Using (2.19), there are 22 · 2! = 8 mappings for QPSK. The symbols 𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠3,
and 𝑠4 refer to the constellation points +1+ 𝑗1, +1− 𝑗1, −1+ 𝑗1, and −1− 𝑗1 each scaled by
1/
√
2, respectively. These equivalent mappings are also shown in Figure 2.2 with colored
labels corresponding to the associated mapping index as shown in Table 2.3.




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bit
Mask
[0 0] [1 0] [0 1] [1 1] [0 0] [1 0] [0 1] [1 1]
Bit
Permutation




















































These alternative mappings are created by applying the associated bit mask and bit permu-
tation, in that order, to the baseline labels given for BRGC mapping index 1. This baseline
corresponds to the 5G NR modulation mapper for QPSK specified in [56, Section 5.1.3] as







1 − 2𝑏(2𝑖 + 1)
) ]
. (2.20)
The left-hand label bit shown for each symbol in Table 2.3 for BRGC mapping index 1
corresponds to 𝑏(2𝑖) in (2.20). Likewise, the right-hand label bit for each symbol corre-
sponds to 𝑏(2𝑖 + 1), and symbols 𝑠1 through 𝑠4 correspond to the produced complex-valued
modulation symbol 𝑑 (𝑖).
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Figure 2.2. Illustration of all equivalent BRGC mappings for QPSK with
colors as shown in Table 2.3.
2.2.3 Mapping Set Building Algorithms
Operations from the previous section are now implemented in a systematic manner to build
a set, S𝑚, of unique alternative mappings. Algorithm M0 is performed first followed by
Algorithms M1 - M2 in any order.
Algorithm Notes
As in Section 2.1.3, values of 𝑏 and 𝑀 for the chosen mapping are known to all algorithms
in this dissertation. All text within curly brackets are comments to aid the reader. The
𝑑𝑒2𝑏𝑖(𝑖, 𝑛, 𝑝) MATLAB function and slightly modified version of the 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠(𝑛) MATLAB
function previously described in Section 2.1.3 are also employed here [52], [54]. Lastly, the
⊕ symbol is used to denote XOR operation.
The base mapping input to Algorithm M0 is an 𝑀-by-𝑏 array, denoted as B𝑚, where each
row contains the bit label associated with the corresponding symbol. Thus, the label bits
corresponding to symbol 𝑠1 are contained in the first row, and the label bits corresponding
to symbol 𝑠𝑀 are contained in the 𝑀th and final row of B𝑚.
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Example 2.2.1. The base mapping input to Algorithm M0 for BRGC mapping index 1









Algorithm M0 - Mapping Set Initialization
Inputs: B𝑚 {Base Mapping},
S𝑚  {Mapping set cardinality}
Outputs: S𝑚 {Set of Mappings}, 𝑃𝑀𝑜 {# of populated mappings in output S𝑚}
1: 𝑃𝑀𝑜 = 1
2: S𝑚 = 3-dimensional array of 0’s of size 𝑀-by-𝑏-by-
S𝑚 
3: S𝑚 (: , : , 1) = B𝑚 {Populate set index 1 with Base Mapping}
4: return S𝑚, 𝑃𝑀𝑜
Algorithm M1 - Bit Inversions
Inputs: S𝑚, 𝑃𝑀𝑖 {# of populated mappings in input S𝑚}
Outputs: S𝑚, 𝑃𝑀𝑜
1: 𝑃𝑀𝑜 = 𝑃𝑀𝑖 · 2𝑏 {Operation limit = 2𝑏}
2: for 𝑖𝑡 = 1 to 2𝑏 − 1 do
3: v𝑏𝑚 = 𝑑𝑒2𝑏𝑖(𝑖𝑡, 𝑏, 2) {Bit mask vector}
4: for 𝑚𝑖 = 1 to 𝑃𝑀𝑖 do
5: for 𝑟𝑖 = 1 to 𝑀 do
6: for 𝑐𝑖 = 1 to 𝑏 do





12: return S𝑚, 𝑃𝑀𝑜
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Algorithm M2 - Bit Permutations
Inputs: S𝑚, 𝑃𝑀𝑖
Outputs: S𝑚, 𝑃𝑀𝑜
1: 𝑃𝑀𝑜 = 𝑃𝑀𝑖 · 𝑏! {Operation limit = 𝑏!}
2: B𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 = 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠(𝑏) {Bit permutations array}
3: for 𝑖𝑡 = 1 to 𝑏! − 1 do
4: v𝑏𝑝 = B𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 (𝑖𝑡 + 1, : ) {Bit permutation vector}
5: for 𝑚𝑖 = 1 to 𝑃𝑀𝑖 do
6: for 𝑟𝑖 = 1 to 𝑀 do




11: return S𝑚, 𝑃𝑀𝑜
2.2.4 Set Cardinalities
Using (2.19) for the baseline mappings discussed in Section 2.2.1, the cardinality of each
set is calculated and recorded in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4. Set cardinality of various baseline modulation mappings.
Modulation QPSK 16QAM 64QAM 256QAMS𝑚  8 384 46, 080 10, 321, 920
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CHAPTER 3:
Transmission and Reception Support Methods
To support alternating STCs and GCH, methods are required to facilitate transmission and
reception. Here we present methods to build the next STC to be employed, decode various
types of STCs, and perform GCH modulation and demodulation.
This chapter includes adaptations from previous work already published or in publication by
the author. Specifically, portions of Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are revised from [9]. Portions
of Section 3.2 are revised from [10]. Portions of Section 3.4 are revised from [11].
3.1 Individual Space-Time Code Building
In schemes that perform beamforming, precoding, or encoding by selecting a code for use
from a known codebook, aka code set, it is common to store the entire codebook for use
as a lookup table (LUT) [41], [58]; however, when the size of the codebook is very large,
this may not be practical, especially for low-storage devices. With this in mind, it would
be desirable to build specific selected STCs from the codebook for use as needed without
storing the entire codebook. In order to do this, three pieces of information are needed:
1. the base code and
2. order of operations/algorithms used to build the intended codebook and
3. the index value of the desired code.
The base code must be known as it is the first indexed code in the set. The order of opera-
tions conducted must also be known as building the set with different order of operations
effectively reindexes the entire set with the exception of the first code. Naturally, the set
is indexed from 1 to
S𝑠. The index value must be known as it specifies the iteration of
each operation to be performed in order to build the selected code, where the iteration of
an operation refers to the value of the 𝑖𝑡 variable in each one of the algorithms provided.
A fourth piece of information, namely the operation limits discussed in Section 2.1.3, must
also be known but can generally be considered as common knowledge for a given code set.
With these pieces of information, a specific STC can be built by starting with the base code,
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determining the specified iteration of each operation to perform based on the given index
value, and performing each operation in the given order. The process for determining the









1 < 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙,
(3.1)
where v𝑜𝑙 is a row vector containing the operation limits for Algorithms S1 - S7 in that
order, v𝑜𝑜 is an order of operations row vector containing the number of each algorithm in
the order in which they are performed to build a code, and 𝑙 is the length of each row vector,
which equals seven when all of the provided algorithms are performed. Upon definition of






















where 𝐼𝑉 represents the index value of the desired code, “mod” represents the modulo
operator, and b c represents the floor function. With these vectors defined, it can be seen that
𝐼𝑉 = v𝑖𝑡 × v𝑇𝑑𝑖𝑣 + 1, (3.3)
where +1 is required due to set indexing starting at 1.
Once the iterations have been determined, the desired code is built by performing Al-
gorithm S0 first with the
S𝑠 input argument set to 1 since only 1 code will be built.
Algorithms S1 - S7 are performed next in the order specified by v𝑜𝑜. To modify each of
these algorithms for individual STC building instead of set building, any reference to S𝑠 is
replaced with G, the values of 𝑃𝐶𝑖 and 𝑃𝐶𝑜 are set to 1, the 𝑖𝑡 variable is set equal to the
value contained in v𝑖𝑡 for that algorithm, and all index values of 𝑃𝐶𝑖 · 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖 are replaced
with 1. For any element of v𝑖𝑡 equal to zero, the corresponding algorithm is not performed.
Example 3.1.1. Using the MPO468 base code with v𝑜𝑜 = [4 6 2 1 3 5 7], 𝐼𝑉 =
3, 824, 537, 371, 943, 𝑎 = 1, variable vectors as given in Table 2.1, and operation limits
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specified in Algorithms S1 - S7, i.e.,
v𝑜𝑙 =
[






















20902 12 7 182 3 3 32
]
, (3.6)
and the built STC is
G =











0 𝑠∗5 𝑠1 −𝑠6
−𝑠6 𝑠∗2 −𝑠3 0
0 𝑠∗3 𝑠2 𝑠
∗
4





It should be noted that the order of operations conducted to build this STC directed Algo-
rithm S6 to be performed prior to Algorithm S3; therefore, A𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑠 = [1 3 4 2 5 6] for this
STC was used to permute v𝑎𝑠𝑟 = [1 2] to v𝑝𝑠𝑟 = [1 3].
3.2 Decoding Methods for Alternating Space-Time Codes
As the STC in use alternates, the receiver, aka UE, must be able to perform channel
equalization, co-phase symbol copies as necessary, and sort data symbols into the correct
location before demodulation. The processes employed by the receiver for the different
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types of STCs presented in Section 2.1.1 are now discussed starting with the description of
a communications link to aid in the discussion.
3.2.1 Alternating STC Communications Link
A potential MIMO communications link between BS and UE begins with a common digital
modulation scheme such as QPSK or MQAM to convert a binary source to data symbols.
These symbols are inserted into the next pseudorandomly built STC and transmitted across
the wireless interface using 𝑐 TX antennas over 𝑟 symbol time periods.
Without loss of generality, the received sample array, Z, is of size 𝑟-by-𝑁𝑅 and represented
as
Z = G × h𝐵𝑈 + n, (3.8)
where 𝑁𝑅 represents the number of receive (RX) antennas, G is the next alternating STC,
h𝐵𝑈 is the 𝑐-by-𝑁𝑅 channel tap array between BS and UE, and n is an 𝑟-by-𝑁𝑅 AWGN
array. The term array is used here to indicate a component that may be a vector or matrix
depending on the STC in use and value of 𝑁𝑅.
UE is assumed to have perfect CSI and knowledge of the STC used with each codeword.
UE performs the applicable decoding method depending on the STC in use to equalize
and decode the data symbols and demodulates the symbols to binary data using the known
digital modulation scheme.
3.2.2 Orthogonal Space-Time Codes
When an orthogonal STC is employed, UE performs maximal ratio combining (MRC) to
equalize and decode the data symbols prior to symbol demodulation.
The general MRC process applicable to all orthogonal STCs given in Section 2.1.1 can be
described by two steps performed in sequence for each RX antenna to obtain an estimated
data symbol array, ŝ. Each column of ŝ contains the estimated data symbol vector for the
corresponding RX antenna. When 𝑁𝑅 > 1, a weighted average of the columns of ŝ is
performed to calculate the final estimated data symbol vector, ŝ.
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The two-step sequence for the 𝑖th RX antenna can be seen as calculating
ŝ𝑖𝑛𝑡 = H†𝐶𝐵𝑈 × Z(: , 𝑖) (3.9)
followed by
ŝ(𝑥, 𝑖) =
ŝ𝑖𝑛𝑡 (𝑥) + ŝ∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (𝑥 + 𝑘)
| |h𝐵𝑈 (: , 𝑖) | |2
(3.10)
for 𝑥 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑘}, where | |h𝐵𝑈 (: , 𝑖) | |2 is the square of the Euclidean norm of h𝐵𝑈 (: , 𝑖), ŝ𝑖𝑛𝑡
is a 2𝑘-by-1 intermediate vector, and H𝐶𝐵𝑈 is an 𝑟-by-2𝑘 combining matrix corresponding
to G such that
H𝐶𝐵𝑈 × s𝑒𝑥𝑡 = G × h𝐵𝑈 (: , 𝑖). (3.11)
The intermediate vector represents a weighted version of s𝑒𝑥𝑡 with noise plus interference
due to spreading of data symbols; however, completion of (3.10) cancels all interfering
terms to produce the estimated data symbol vector for the 𝑖th RX antenna. This can be
shown to be true according to the sufficient statistics
Ĥ = | |h𝐵𝑈 (: , 𝑖) | |2 · I𝑘 , (3.12)
where I𝑘 is a 𝑘-by-𝑘 identity matrix,
Ĥ(𝑥, 𝑦) = H𝑖𝑛𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑦) + H∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (𝑥 + 𝑘, 𝑦 + 𝑘) (3.13)
+ H𝑖𝑛𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑦 + 𝑘) + H∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (𝑥 + 𝑘, 𝑦)
for 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑘}, and
H𝑖𝑛𝑡 = H†𝐶𝐵𝑈 × H𝐶𝐵𝑈 . (3.14)
This represents a systematic approach to finding 𝑘 vectors to solve for each of the 𝑘
data symbols contained within any complex orthogonal STC using MRC. These sufficient
statistics meet those given in [59, (10.272)].
When 𝑁𝑅 > 1, these steps are repeated for each RX antenna. The final estimated data
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symbol vector is obtained by taking the weighted average of the columns of ŝ as
ŝ = ŝ ×

| |h𝐵𝑈 (: , 1) | |2/ℎ𝐵𝑈
...






| |h𝐵𝑈 (: , 𝑖) | |2 (3.16)
is the summation of the squared Euclidean norms for each RX antenna channel tap vector.
3.2.3 Combining Matrix Determination
The process for determining the combining matrix, H𝐶𝐵𝑈 , for any given complex orthogonal
STC matrix, G, and channel tap vector, h𝐵𝑈 (: , 𝑖), can be seen as solving the system of
equations given in (3.11) for the terms of H𝐶𝐵𝑈 with appropriate constraints. In general,
the terms of H𝐶𝐵𝑈 are constrained to zeros, weighted terms from h𝐵𝑈 (: , 𝑖), and sums of
these weighted terms. The use of sums of weighted terms is provided to account for this
approach to be applied with the MPO334 and MPO434 STCs. An algorithmic approach for
construction of these combining matrices given the channel tap vector and STC matrix is
provided in Algorithm S8. For added generality, H𝐶 and h are used in place of H𝐶𝐵𝑈 and
h𝐵𝑈 , respectively.
Example 3.2.1. Given a single RX antenna, channel tap vector h = [ℎ1 ℎ2 ℎ3]𝑇 , and






























Algorithm S8 - Combining Matrix Generation
Input: G {STC Matrix}, h {Channel tap vector}
Output: H𝐶 {Combining Matrix}
1: H𝐶 = 2-dimensional array of 0’s of size 𝑟-by-2𝑘
2: for 𝑑𝑖 = 1 to 𝑑 do
3: for 𝑟𝑖 = 1 to 𝑟 do
4: for 𝑐𝑖 = 1 to 𝑐 do
5: if G(𝑟𝑖, 𝑐𝑖, 𝑑𝑖) ≠ 0 then





7: 𝑤 = positive weight applied to G(𝑟𝑖, 𝑐𝑖, 𝑑𝑖)
{e.g., 𝑤 = 1√
2










9: if G(𝑟𝑖, 𝑐𝑖, 𝑑𝑖) is conjugated then
10: 𝑔 = 1
11: else
12: 𝑔 = 0
13: end if






































Example 3.2.2. A variant of the MPO334 STC is generated using Algorithms S1, S2,
and S3 with 𝑎 = 3. Within Algorithm S1, the first row of the base STC in (2.4) is rotated
with a PR angle index of 𝑥 = 1. Within Algorithm S2, the second column is rotated with a
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PR angle index of 𝑥 = 2. Within Algorithm S3, symbol 𝑠1 is rotated with a PR angle index
of 𝑥 = 3. Thus, the resulting variant of the MPO334 STC is represented as
G =































Given a single RX antenna with this STC and channel tap vector h = [ℎ1 ℎ2 ℎ3]𝑇 , the
corresponding H𝐶 matrix generated using Algorithm S8 is given as
H𝐶 =































Example 3.2.3. Given a single RX antenna, channel tap vector h = [ℎ1 ℎ2 ℎ3 ℎ4]𝑇 , and
MPO468 base code originally given in (2.3) as
G =
























the corresponding H𝐶 matrix generated using Algorithm S8 is given as
H𝐶 =

ℎ1 ℎ2 ℎ3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ℎ4 ℎ2 −ℎ1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −ℎ4 0 ℎ3 0 −ℎ1 0 0 0
0 0 0 ℎ4 0 0 0 ℎ3 −ℎ2 0 0 0
0 0 0 ℎ1 ℎ2 ℎ3 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ℎ4 0 0 0 0 0 0 ℎ2 −ℎ1 0
0 −ℎ4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ℎ3 0 −ℎ1
ℎ4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ℎ3 −ℎ2

. (3.20)
3.2.4 Non-Orthogonal and Spatially-Multiplexed Space-Time Codes
Receivers of SM or non-orthogonal STCs typically employ sorted QR decomposition
(SQRD) along with a successive interference cancellation (SIC) decoder and/or sphere
decoding (SD) [60]–[64]. We use these decoding techniques and adapt them as necessary
to work with an alternating STC.
To explain this adaptation, we begin with a MIMO system using spatial multiplexing with
two TX antennas and two RX antennas. The SM221 STC is used as the base STC along
with the set building algorithms with 𝑎 = 6 to build a set of unique alternative STCs.
Algorithm S8 is also used with this system to obtain an initial matrix for use with SQRD
and follow-on SD techniques.
The received sample array, Z, given in (3.8) still applies to these types of STCs. For this
discussion, the next STC is represented as
G =
[
𝑠2 · 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/8 𝑠∗1 · 𝑒
𝑗5𝜋/32] , (3.21)
where it can be seen that multiple operations have been applied to the base code in (2.11).
To begin the decoding process, Algorithm S8 is repeated using CSI for each RX an-
tenna with resulting H𝐶 matrices concatenated vertically to obtain a final H𝐶𝐵𝑈 matrix
of size 𝑟𝑁𝑅-by-2𝑘 . The channel tap vector input for the 𝑖th RX antenna is represented
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as h𝐵𝑈 (:, 𝑖) = [ℎ1𝑖 . . . ℎ𝑐𝑖]𝑇 . Thus, performing these steps for the STC in (3.21) for the
described MIMO system employing two RX antennas, the final H𝐶𝐵𝑈 matrix is given as
H𝐶𝐵𝑈 =
[
0 ℎ11 · 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/8 ℎ21 · 𝑒 𝑗5𝜋/32 0
0 ℎ12 · 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/8 ℎ22 · 𝑒 𝑗5𝜋/32 0
]
. (3.22)
The remaining approach differs depending on whether or not the STC in use employs
transmit diversity. We now present how the remaining portion of this decoding approach
differs for these two different types of STCs. Block diagrams are shown in Fig. 3.1 to
illustrate decoding steps for both types of STCs. The dashed arrows in each block diagram
represent two optional paths of which only one must be taken.
Decoding STCs Without Transmit Diversity
We start by discussing the remaining decoding steps required for SMSTCs.
First, we form a restructured H𝐶𝐵𝑈 matrix, denoted as H𝑅𝐶 , while noting which symbols are
conjugated. We then solve for the symbols, or conjugate symbols, using SQRD and SIC to
obtain an estimate of the transmitted symbol vector. SD techniques may then be employed
to obtain a near maximum-likelihood (ML) result. Any symbols noted as being conjugated
initially must be conjugated again at the end of this process to solve for the original data
symbol vector.
The process of forming H𝑅𝐶 while noting which symbols are conjugated starts by identifying
the columns within the left-most 𝑘 columns of H𝐶𝐵𝑈 that are filled with zeros. These column
indices represent symbols that are conjugated from the data symbol vector, s, in order to
create the transmitted symbol vector, denoted as s𝑇 . From the two left-most columns of
(3.22), it can be seen that only the first column is filled with zeros indicating that 𝑠1 is
conjugated and 𝑠2 is not. Upon noting these symbols, H𝑅𝐶 is formed by summing together
the left and right halves of H𝐶𝐵𝑈 as
H𝑅𝐶 = H𝐶𝐵𝑈 (:, 1 : 𝑘) + H𝐶𝐵𝑈 (:, 𝑘 + 1 : 2𝑘)
=
[
ℎ21 · 𝑒 𝑗5𝜋/32 ℎ11 · 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/8


















































































































































































































































































































































































































The received sample array shown in (3.8) may now be rewritten as
vec(Z) = H𝑅𝐶 × s𝑇 + vec(n)
=
[
ℎ21 · 𝑒 𝑗5𝜋/32 ℎ11 · 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/8














where vec( ) represents the vec operator used to “vectorize” or vertically concatenate the
columns of the argument to convert the argument into a column vector.
The minimum mean square error (MMSE)-SQRD and SIC processes given in [65] are now
completed to obtain an estimate of s𝑇 , denoted as ŝ𝑇 . For clarity of discussion, portions of
these processes from [65] are repeated here with symbols modified to stay consistent with
this dissertation.








according to Tab. 1 of [65], where 𝜎𝑛 represents standard deviation of AWGN, and I𝑘 is a
𝑘-by-𝑘 identity matrix. QR decomposition yields
H(:, p) = Q × R, (3.26)
where p represents a 1-by-𝑘 permutation vector that indicates the sorted column order of
H obtained while performing the MMSE-SQRD algorithm allowing for a more optimal
detection sequence [65]. The post-sorting algorithm shown in Tab. 2 of [65] may be subse-
quently performed to find the most optimal sequence, but from analysis provided in [65], it
is generally not necessary and adds additional complexity. Thus, it is not further discussed
here.
The next step is to use the determined Q and R matrices while applying SIC to obtain an
initial estimate of s𝑝 = ŝ𝑇 (p). Thus, s𝑝 is a permuted version of the transmitted symbol
vector estimate utilizing p for improved sequence of detection. To begin this step, the
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and multiplied by Q−1 = Q† such that
s̃ = Q† × Z. (3.28)
SIC is then applied to obtain initial estimates of the elements of s𝑝 in reverse order (i.e.,
𝑖 = 𝑘, . . . , 1) due to the upper triangular nature of R. This SIC process is shown as




s̃(𝑖),R𝑖𝑖 · 𝑥 +
𝑘∑︁
𝑗=𝑖+1
R𝑖 𝑗 · s𝑝 ( 𝑗)
)
, (3.29)
where 𝑑 (𝑦, 𝑧) represents Euclidean distance between 𝑦 and 𝑧, R𝑖 𝑗 represents the element in
the 𝑖th row and 𝑗 th column of R, and M is the set of all symbols in the 𝑀-ary modulation
scheme [65], [66]. Although somewhat obvious, it should be noted in (3.29) that summation
is not performed for 𝑖 = 𝑘 as the summation bounds are invalid.
Upon obtaining this estimate of s𝑝, it must be decided whether or not to continue with
SD techniques such as in [61], [64] to obtain near ML results. For conciseness, we do not
discuss these techniques further than to say that by using the initial estimate as the starting
point for SD, these techniques may be used to yield a more accurate estimate of s𝑝.
If BER performance loss at this stage is acceptable, and a reduced-complexity decoding
process is desired, the initial estimate of s𝑝 may be used during the next decoding step. The
amount of performance loss is shown in Chapter 6. Regardless of whether initial or final
estimate of s𝑝 is employed, an estimate of the data symbol vector, ŝ, may be obtained from
s𝑝. This is achieved by first finding the inverse permutation, denoted as p−1, of p such that
p(p−1) = [1 . . . 𝑘]. The inverse permutation of s𝑝 is then performed to obtain an estimate
of the transmitted symbol vector, ŝ𝑇 = s𝑝 (p−1). The symbols noted as being conjugated
initially must now be conjugated again within ŝ𝑇 to obtain ŝ. Recall it was noted that 𝑠1 is
conjugated within s𝑇 for the STC given in (3.21).
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This completes the decoding process for SMSTCs. We now discuss the remaining steps
involved to decode STCs with transmit diversity.
Decoding STCs With Transmit Diversity
If these same techniques are applied to STCs employing transmit diversity, additional steps
are required to maximally combine the multiple copies of each data symbol.
The base STC for this section is the NO442 STC given in (2.10). Due to the transmit
diversity employed by this STC, only two RX antennas are required; thus, 𝑁𝑅 = 2.
The received sample array, Z, for this system is still represented in (3.8) but with array




𝑗21𝜋/16 𝑠∗3 · 𝑒
𝑗15𝜋/16 𝑠2 · 𝑒 𝑗49𝜋/32 𝑠∗1 · 𝑒
𝑗57𝜋/32
𝑠∗2 · 𝑒
𝑗3𝜋/2 𝑠1 · 𝑒 𝑗39𝜋/32 𝑠4 · 𝑒 𝑗23𝜋/32 𝑠3 · 𝑒 𝑗17𝜋/16
]
. (3.30)
As in the previous section, Algorithm S8 is repeated using CSI for each RX antenna with
resulting H𝐶 matrices concatenated vertically to obtain a final H𝐶𝐵𝑈 matrix of size 𝑟𝑁𝑅-
by-2𝑘 . As before, the channel tap vector input for the 𝑖th RX antenna is represented as
h𝐵𝑈 (:, 𝑖) = [ℎ1𝑖 . . . ℎ𝑐𝑖]𝑇 . Thus, performing these steps for the STC in (3.30) for the
described MIMO system employing two RX antennas, the final H𝐶𝐵𝑈 matrix is given as
H𝐶𝐵𝑈 =

0 ℎ21 · 𝑒 𝑗39𝜋/32 0 ℎ22 · 𝑒 𝑗39𝜋/32
ℎ31 · 𝑒 𝑗49𝜋/32 0 ℎ32 · 𝑒 𝑗49𝜋/32 0
0 ℎ41 · 𝑒 𝑗17𝜋/16 0 ℎ42 · 𝑒 𝑗17𝜋/16
0 ℎ31 · 𝑒 𝑗23𝜋/32 0 ℎ32 · 𝑒 𝑗23𝜋/32
ℎ41 · 𝑒 𝑗57𝜋/32 0 ℎ42 · 𝑒 𝑗57𝜋/32 0
0 ℎ11 · 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/2 0 ℎ12 · 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/2
ℎ21 · 𝑒 𝑗15𝜋/16 0 ℎ22 · 𝑒 𝑗15𝜋/16 0




Note that (3.31) is given in transposed form to better fit on the page.
As in the previous section, the next step is to form the restructured H𝐶𝐵𝑈 matrix; however,
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to properly combine the multiple copies of each transmitted symbol for the STC given in
(3.30), this restructured matrix must also be real-valued. This allows for real and imaginary






























H𝐶𝐵𝑈 (:, 𝑖𝑘 + 1 : 𝑖𝑘 + 𝑘)
)
· (−1)𝑖, (3.35)
where <( ) represents the real component(s) of the argument and =( ) represents the
imaginary component(s) of the argument. These four real-valued matrices are then combined







The received sample array from (3.8) may now be split into real-valued components and
rewritten as
























) ] , (3.37)
where s< is the real-valued data symbol vector such that s = s<(1 : 𝑘) + 𝑗s<(𝑘 + 1 : 2𝑘)
[66], [67]. The MMSE-SQRD and SIC processes given in [65] are now completed to obtain
an estimate of s<, denoted as ŝ<.











according to Tab. 1 of [65], where I2𝑘 is a 2𝑘-by-2𝑘 identity matrix. QR decomposition
yields
H(:, p) = Q × R, (3.39)
where p is a 1-by-2𝑘 permutation vector in this instance [65].
The next step is to use the determined Q and R matrices while applying SIC to obtain an
initial estimate of s<𝑝 = ŝ<(p). Thus, s<𝑝 is a permuted version of the real-valued data
symbol vector estimate utilizing p for improved sequence of detection. To begin this step,







and multiplied by Q−1 = Q𝑇 such that
s̃< = Q𝑇 × Z<. (3.41)
SIC is then applied to obtain initial estimates of the elements of s<𝑝 in reverse order (i.e.,
𝑖 = 2𝑘, . . . , 1) due to the upper triangular nature of R. This SIC process is shown as




s̃<(𝑖),R𝑖𝑖 · 𝑥 +
2𝑘∑︁
𝑗=𝑖+1
R𝑖 𝑗 · s<𝑝 ( 𝑗)
)
, (3.42)
whereM< is the set of all unique real values for symbols in the 𝑀-ary modulation scheme
[65], [66]. This assumes that the set of all unique imaginary values for these symbols is
the same asM<, which is true for all common digital modulation schemes including those
specified in [56] for the 5G NR. As with (3.29), it should be noted in (3.42) that summation
is not performed for 𝑖 = 2𝑘 as the summation bounds are invalid.
As in the previous section, it must be decided whether or not to continue with SD techniques
to obtain a more accurate estimate of s<𝑝. Similar to before, regardless of whether initial
or final estimate is employed, an estimate of the data symbol vector, ŝ, may be obtained
from s<𝑝. This is achieved by first performing the inverse permutation of s<𝑝 to obtain
an estimate of the real-valued data symbol vector, ŝ< = s<𝑝 (p−1). The final estimate of
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the data symbol vector is obtained by combining the real and imaginary components as
ŝ = ŝ<(1 : 𝑘) + 𝑗 ŝ<(𝑘 + 1 : 2𝑘).
This completes the decoding process for non-orthogonal STCs employing transmit diversity.
3.3 Individual Mapping Building
Similar to individual STC building, it may be desirable to build specific selected mappings
from the set, aka codebook, for use as needed without storing the entire codebook. Although
this is likely unnecessary when 𝑏 is small, for 𝑏 = 8 as with 256QAM, the full set consists of
28 · 8! = 10, 321, 920 mappings each consisting of 𝑀 byte-sized labels; thus, the 256QAM
set of mappings requires 2, 520 megabytes of storage. This may not be an issue for some
systems; however, maintaining the entire set of mappings available for rapid access is likely
problematic.
In order to build an individual mapping from the set, three pieces of information are needed:
1. the base mapping and
2. order of operations/algorithms used to build the mapping set and
3. the index value of the desired mapping.
As with STC sets, the base mapping must be known as it is the first indexed mapping in the
set. Recall, the order of operations conducted must also be known as this reindexes the set.
Again, the set is indexed from 1 to
S𝑚 . The index value must be known as it specifies the
iteration of each operation to be performed in order to build the selected mapping, where the
iteration of an operation refers to the value of the 𝑖𝑡 variable in each one of the algorithms
provided.
With these pieces of information as with STC building, a specific mapping can be built
by starting with the base mapping, determining the specified iteration of each operation
to perform based on the given index value, and performing each operation in the given
order. Recall, the process for determining the specified iteration of each operation starts by
defining a 1-by-𝑙 divisor vector, v𝑑𝑖𝑣, with elements calculated using (3.1).
Similar to calculation of (3.1) for STC building, v𝑜𝑙 is a row vector containing the operation
limits for Algorithms M1 - M2 in that order, v𝑜𝑜 is an order of operations row vector
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containing the number of each algorithm in the order in which they are performed to build a
mapping, and 𝑙 is the length of each row vector, which equals two when all of the provided
algorithms are performed. Upon definition of row vector v𝑑𝑖𝑣, the iteration of each operation
can be contained within a 1-by-𝑙 iterations vector, v𝑖𝑡 , with elements given in (3.2), where
𝐼𝑉 represents the index value of the desired mapping.
Once the iterations have been determined, the desired mapping is built by performing
Algorithm M0 first with the
S𝑚  input argument set to 1 since only 1 mapping will be built.
Algorithms M1 - M2 are performed next in the order specified by v𝑜𝑜. To modify each of
these algorithms for individual mapping building instead of set building, any reference to
S𝑚 is replaced with B𝑚, the values of 𝑃𝐶𝑖 and 𝑃𝐶𝑜 are set to 1, the 𝑖𝑡 variable is set equal to
the value contained in v𝑖𝑡 for that algorithm, and all index values of 𝑃𝐶𝑖 · 𝑖𝑡 +𝑚𝑖 are replaced
with 1. For any element of v𝑖𝑡 equal to zero, the corresponding algorithm is not performed.
Example 3.3.1. With a QPSK base map corresponding to BRGC mapping index 1 from
































corresponding to BRGC mapping index 3 in Table 2.3.
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3.4 Gray Code Hopping Modulation and Demodulation
Unlike with alternating the STC in use, the entire mapping is not required to be known in
order to perform GCH. Only the specific symbol within the chosen mapping corresponding
to the next set of 𝑏 bits must be known to perform bit to symbol translation. This allows for
more flexibility in implementation of GCH. We now present two equivalent implementations
of a GCH modulator and demodulator.
Fig. 3.2(a) shows the basic flow through one possible implementation that employs in-
ternal mapping functions or LUTs associated with each of the possible BRGC mappings.
Fig. 3.2(b) shows the flow through an equivalent two-step method implementation. In each
block diagram, the “Next IV Generator” is the element controlling the hopping sequence.
In the next chapter, a proposed hopping sequence is presented, but for now, only the next
IV must be known to determine the chosen mapping index and corresponding iteration of
each operation to be performed. The order of operations for both implementations shown











Equivalent GCH Modulator Equivalent GCH Demodulator
(a)
(b)
Next IV Generator Next IV Generator
Bit 
Mask
SymbolsBits Alternative BRGC 
Mapping Function or LUT
BitsAlternative 
BRGC LUT
GCH Modulator GCH Demodulator
Next IV Generator Next IV Generator
ML
Detector
Figure 3.2. Example implementations of a GCH modulator and demodulator.
(a) Internal mapping function or LUT implementation. (b) Equivalent two-
step method implementation.
3.4.1 Bit to Symbol Translation
Once a mapping has been chosen for use with the next modulation symbol, BS must perform
bit to symbol translation. One approach to accomplish this translation involves the use of a
mapping function, such as (2.20), given in [56, Section 5.1] or establishment of the chosen
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mapping as a LUT. This approach is represented in Fig. 3.2(a) and requires a mapping
function or LUT for each alternative BRGC mapping. Whereas this method is valid and
possibly well-suited for the case when 𝑏 is small (e.g., 𝑏 < 8), implementation for 256QAM
becomes unduly complex due to the large number of alternative mappings.
An equivalent method of performing this translation involves performing the bit mask and
permutation operations on the data bits themselves instead of the binary constellation labels
as initially discussed. This equivalent method consists of two steps.
First, the bit mask and bit permutation operations associated with the chosen BRGC mapping
are performed on the data bits in reverse order; thus, if the specified order of operations
is v𝑜𝑜 = [1 2], then the data bits are permuted and then masked accordingly as shown in
Fig. 3.2(b). The associated bit mask and bit permutation operations are determined within
Algorithms M1 and M2, according to v𝑖𝑡 , for the chosen BRGC mapping index, as discussed
in Section 3.3.
Example 3.4.1. From Example 3.3.1 for the QPSK mapping set, v𝑜𝑜 = [1 2], 𝐼𝑉 = 3,
and v𝑖𝑡 = [2 0]; thus, within Algorithm M1, 𝑖𝑡 = 2, and the associated bit mask vector is
v𝑏𝑚 = 𝑑𝑒2𝑏𝑖(2, 2, 2) = [0 1]. With 𝑖𝑡 = 0 for Algorithm M2, no operation is required; thus,
the original bit permutation of [1 2] is associated with this mapping.
Second, the permuted and masked data bits are translated to symbols using the baseline
modulation mapping function or equivalent LUT.
Example 3.4.2. BRGC mapping index 1 in Table 2.3 represents a LUT implementation
of the 5G NR modulation mapping function for QPSK shown in (2.20). For this example,
BRGC mapping index 1 is selected as the baseline mapping with v𝑜𝑜 = [1 2]. The chosen
mapping for the next symbol is BRGC mapping index 6. Given data bits of 10, employing
Table 2.3 as a set of LUTs indicates that symbol 𝑠4 should be produced as these data bits
correspond to the 𝑠4 label for that mapping. Equivalently, performing the bit permutation
associated with BRGC mapping index 6 (i.e., [2 1]) on the given data bits yields permuted
bits of 01. Subsequently performing the bit mask operation associated with BRGC mapping
index 6 (i.e., [1 0]) on the permuted bits yields 11. From Table 2.3, employing BRGC
mapping index 1 with permuted and masked data bits of 11 indicates that symbol 𝑠4 is
produced. Thus, both methods produce the same result.
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3.4.2 Symbol to Bit Demodulation
Upon reception and downconversion to baseband symbols, UE must perform demodulation
of the symbols to obtain an estimate of the transmitted data bits. UE could perform this
function by first using a ML detector to determine the most likely transmitted constellation
symbol. An alternative BRGC LUT is then used to translate the determined symbol to the
corresponding bits based on the chosen alternative BRGC mapping as shown in Fig. 3.2(a).
Similar to the equivalent two-step method employed for bit to symbol translation, the reverse
of this method may be used for symbol to bit demodulation. With this method, UE uses a
baseline demodulator employing ML detection and demapping function with hard decision
decoding to first obtain the permuted and masked data bits. For this system with v𝑜𝑜 = [1 2],
the appropriate bit mask for the chosen BRGC mapping index is then applied followed by
the inverse of the bit permutation performed by BS to obtain an estimate of the transmitted
data bits as shown in Fig. 3.2(b). Although inconsequential for the QPSK scheme with
only two data bits, it is important to note the inverse bit permutation is required by UE for
higher-order modulation schemes when using this equivalent method.
Example 3.4.3. In the case of 16QAM, if BS permutes the data bits according to permutation
[2 3 1 4], UE must perform the inverse permutation [3 1 2 4].
Although hard decision decoding has been assumed until this point, soft decision decoding
with the use of log-likelihood ratios (LLRs) for each bit is permitted with the equivalent
demodulator. When soft decision decoding is performed by the baseline demodulator, the bit
mask operation is replaced with LLR negation as this represents switching the probabilities
of the bit being a 0 and a 1; thus, for each bit in the bit mask with a value of 1, the
corresponding LLR is negated. The inverse bit permutation operation is maintained as it
permutes the LLRs associated with the bits to be permuted. For this case, LLRs exit to the
right of the equivalent GCH demodulator shown in Fig. 3.2(b) instead of bits.
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CHAPTER 4:
Proposed Physical Layer Security Framework
This chapter includes adaptations from previous work already published or in publication
by the author. Specifically, portions of the introduction and Sections 4.1 and 4.2 are revised
from [9].
As stated in Section 1.2, the primary objective for our research is to develop a tailorable PLS
framework including optional techniques designed to alternate the STC and/or modulation
mapping in use over a wireless communications link. Thus, we now present each of these
optional techniques that may be implemented individually or concurrently as desired. As
these schemes are predominantly located at the physical layer, details regarding medium
access, flow, and error control are not discussed and are left as a topic of future research.
Downlink transmission (e.g., BS to UE) is the sole focus of this research; however, both
techniques could readily be extended to include uplink transmission.
4.1 Alternating Space-Time Coding
This technique involves three phases: steady state, initialization, and data transmission. The
basic elements of each phase are illustrated in Fig. 4.1.
4.1.1 Steady State
During this phase, communication has not yet begun between the BS and UE; however, it is
assumed that each entity has certain a priori knowledge. This includes an original base STC
vector (v𝑜𝑏𝑠) that is a data-type agnostic, or categorical type, vector containing one or more
of the base codes provided in Section 2.1.1. Operation limits for each base code as discussed
in Sections 2.1.3 and 3.1 for a pre-determined value of 𝑎 and the unique contents contained
on UE’s subscriber identity module (SIM) are also considered a priori knowledge. These
unique contents include a base STC index vector (v𝑏𝑠𝑖) and a base order of STC operations
vector (v𝑏𝑜𝑠𝑜). The elements of v𝑏𝑠𝑖 are indices for each base code in v𝑜𝑏𝑠. With this a
priori information, both entities are able to build a unique base STC vector (v𝑢𝑏𝑠) using the










































































𝐯𝑡𝑏𝑠 NSS NSI 𝐯𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑜
k symbols ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
Figure 4.1. Basic elements for each phase of the alternating STC PLS
scheme.
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operations in the order specified by v𝑏𝑜𝑠𝑜 to the base codes from v𝑜𝑏𝑠 with corresponding
index values from v𝑏𝑠𝑖.






where Alamouti, SPO334, and MPO468 are given in (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3), respectively.
The UE SIM contains unique contents of
v𝑏𝑠𝑖 =
[





3 6 2 1 7 4 5
]
. (4.3)




𝑠2 · 𝑒 𝑗5𝜋/8 𝑠∗1 · 𝑒
𝑗15𝜋/8







𝑗7𝜋/4 𝑠2 · 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/4 0
𝑠3 · 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/4 0 𝑠2 · 𝑒 𝑗7𝜋/8
0 𝑠3 𝑠∗1 · 𝑒
𝑗5𝜋/8
𝑠∗2 · 𝑒







𝑗3𝜋/8 𝑠2 · 𝑒 𝑗9𝜋/8 𝑠3 · 𝑒 𝑗7𝜋/8 0
𝑠∗2 · 𝑒
𝑗15𝜋/8 𝑠1 · 𝑒 𝑗13𝜋/8 0 𝑠4 · 𝑒 𝑗15𝜋/8
𝑠∗3 · 𝑒
𝑗13𝜋/8 0 𝑠1 · 𝑒 𝑗9𝜋/8 𝑠6 · 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/2
0 𝑠∗3 · 𝑒
𝑗7𝜋/4 𝑠∗2 · 𝑒
𝑗𝜋/2 𝑠5
𝑠5 · 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/8 𝑠6 · 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/4 𝑠4 · 𝑒 𝑗13𝜋/8 0
𝑠∗6 · 𝑒
𝑗9𝜋/8 𝑠∗5 · 𝑒
𝑗3𝜋/4 0 𝑠3
𝑠∗4 · 𝑒
𝑗9𝜋/8 0 𝑠∗5 · 𝑒
𝑗13𝜋/8 𝑠2 · 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/8
0 𝑠∗4 · 𝑒




The SIM also includes a STC seed obfuscation key (SOK𝑠) used during the next phase to
obfuscate the received seed to minimize any impact of the seed being intercepted. For a
given v𝑜𝑏𝑠, the number of unique combinations of v𝑏𝑠𝑖, v𝑏𝑜𝑠𝑜, and SOK𝑠 with length of
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SOK𝑠 bits is used to determine the number of unique SIMs which is
2




S𝑠 (𝑖) is the set cardinality for the 𝑖th base code in v𝑜𝑏𝑠.
4.1.2 Initialization
During this phase, it is desired for communication to begin. A random seed is transmitted
from BS to UE using a secret sharing method such as the post-quantum cross-layer key
agreement scheme presented in [2]. Each entity performs modulo-2 addition, denoted by
the ⊕ symbol in Fig. 4.1, between the bits of this random seed and the SOK𝑠 to obtain an
obfuscated seed. Each entity then uses this seed to synchronize PRNGs. Next, pseudorandom
numbers (PRNs) are generated to create a temporary v𝑏𝑠𝑖 (v𝑡𝑏𝑠𝑖) and temporary order of




S𝑠 (𝑖)) + 1. (4.8)
The v𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑜 is set by indexing a row from a permutations array containing the elements from
v𝑏𝑜𝑠𝑜 in lexicographic order, where the row index is set as
row index = (PRN mod 7!) + 1. (4.9)
Example 4.1.2. Set cardinalities for the base codes in (4.1), provided in Table 2.2,
for 𝑎 = 4 are used in (4.8) with consecutive PRNs of 7, 338, 378, 580, 900, 475;
8, 158, 648, 460, 577, 917; and 1, 143, 795, 557, 080, 799 to obtain
v𝑡𝑏𝑠𝑖 =
[
14, 972 12, 336, 958, 590 1, 143, 795, 557, 080, 800
]
. (4.10)
With v𝑏𝑜𝑠𝑜 given in (4.3) and PRN = 278, 570, 369, 041, 398, the row index = 1639 using
(4.9); therefore, v𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑜 = [2 6 4 1 3 7 5] as shown in Fig. 4.2.
With these session variables, v𝑢𝑏𝑠, and operation limits, both entities build a temporary base




1 3 6 2 1 7 4 5









1638 2 6 4 3 5 7 1
1639 2 6 4 1 3 7 5









5039 5 4 7 1 2 3 6
5040 5 4 7 1 2 6 3

Figure 4.2. Illustration of indexing into permutations array containing ele-
ments of v𝑏𝑜𝑠𝑜 in lexicographic order with row index = 1639.
Example 4.1.3. Using v𝑢𝑏𝑠 from Example 4.1.1 and the determined session variables from




𝑗3𝜋/4 𝑠∗2 · 𝑒
𝑗13𝜋/8






𝑗7𝜋/8 𝑠∗1 · 𝑒
𝑗5𝜋/8 0
𝑠∗2 · 𝑒
𝑗7𝜋/8 0 𝑠∗1 · 𝑒
𝑗5𝜋/8
0 𝑠∗2 · 𝑒
𝑗5𝜋/4 𝑠∗3 · 𝑒
𝑗𝜋/4






𝑗13𝜋/8 0 𝑠∗4 𝑠2 · 𝑒
𝑗3𝜋/4
0 𝑠∗5 · 𝑒
𝑗𝜋/2 𝑠∗6 · 𝑒
𝑗𝜋/2 𝑠∗1 · 𝑒
𝑗𝜋/8
𝑠∗2 · 𝑒
𝑗9𝜋/8 𝑠1 · 𝑒 𝑗5𝜋/8 0 𝑠5 · 𝑒 𝑗5𝜋/4
𝑠∗3 · 𝑒
𝑗3𝜋/2 0 𝑠1 · 𝑒 𝑗7𝜋/8 𝑠6 · 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/2
𝑠∗1 · 𝑒
𝑗9𝜋/8 𝑠2 · 𝑒 𝑗13𝜋/8 𝑠3 · 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/2 0
0 𝑠∗3 · 𝑒











During this phase, the synchronized PRNGs from the initialization phase are used to generate
PRNs in order to determine the next STC to be used during transmission from BS to UE.
If there is more than one base code in v𝑜𝑏𝑠, then the code set must be determined first. The




v𝑜𝑏𝑠) + 1. (4.14)
From the set of STCs built using the temporary base code specified by NSS, the next STC




S𝑠 (NSS)) + 1. (4.15)
Using these set and index values, v𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑜, v𝑡𝑏𝑠, and operation limits, both entities build the
next STC using the process detailed in Section 3.1.
Example 4.1.4. For the system in Examples 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.3 with PRN =
3, 841, 906, 826, 998, 665, (4.14) is used to calculate NSS = 1; thus, v𝑡𝑏𝑠 (1) is the base
code to build the next STC. With the next PRN = 3, 177, 477, 576, 842, 494, (4.15) is used
to calculate NSI = 23, 807. Thus, the next STC is
G =
[
𝑠1 · 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/8 𝑠2 · 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/4
𝑠∗2 · 𝑒




As each STC consists of 𝑘 data symbols, the steps described here for determining the
NSS, NSI, and building the next STC are repeated for each set of 𝑘 data symbols to be
transmitted. The value of 𝑘 is also variable depending on the base codes contained within
v𝑜𝑏𝑠. UE performs the decoding steps described in Section 3.2 for each STC as applicable.
4.1.4 Pseudorandom Number Size Considerations
An assumption made with this technique thus far is that PRNs are capable of being generated
at least as large as the largest set cardinality of any STC in v𝑜𝑏𝑠 for the pre-determined value
of 𝑎; however, from Table 2.2 it can be seen that set cardinalities are capable of being very
large. For instance, MPO468 with 𝑎 = 9 produces a set of 1.54 · 1044 unique STCs; thus,
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PRNs would be required to be at least 147 bits.
In situations where set cardinalities exceed the length of the PRNG, multiple PRNs may
be generated to create an alternative iterations vector (v𝑎𝑖𝑡) to be used in place of v𝑖𝑡 when
building individual STCs using the Section 3.1 process. The v𝑎𝑖𝑡 is a 1-by-𝑙 vector similar







+ 1, 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑙}, (4.17)
where 𝑙 is the length of each row vector.
For the initialization phase when this is the case, v𝑎𝑖𝑡 is determined for each code in v𝑢𝑏𝑠 by
using v𝑏𝑜𝑠𝑜 in place of v𝑜𝑜. Then the elements of v𝑡𝑏𝑠𝑖 are set using (3.3) by replacing v𝑖𝑡
with v𝑎𝑖𝑡 as
v𝑡𝑏𝑠𝑖 (𝑖) = v𝑎𝑖𝑡 × v𝑇𝑑𝑖𝑣 + 1. (4.18)
For the data transmission phase when this is the case, v𝑎𝑖𝑡 is determined in place of the NSI
and subsequent v𝑖𝑡 by using v𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑜 in place of v𝑜𝑜.
The workaround provided in this section still relies on the assumption that PRNs are capable
of being generated at least as large as the largest operation limit contained in v𝑜𝑙 ; however,
for MPO468 with 𝑎 = 9, the row PRs operation limit is 2𝑎𝑟 = 272. Thus, in situations
where operation limits exceed the length of the PRNG, it is assumed that multiple PRNs
are generated to overcome this limitation. Details involved with this particular workaround
are left as an area of future research.
4.1.5 Antenna Mapping
When multiple STCs are contained within v𝑜𝑏𝑠 with different number of TX antenna
requirements, a decision must be made as to which TX antennas to use when the next STC
to be employed does not require all TX antennas. Whereas a new vector could be defined
for this purpose and added as a SIM unique content, it is chosen at this time to simply use
another PRN to select the next antenna permutation. This method is chosen to provide load
balancing across TX antenna radio frequency (RF) chains.
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4.1.6 Base Code Permutations
When multiple STCs are contained within v𝑜𝑏𝑠, a permutation could be applied to the STCs
within the v𝑡𝑏𝑠. This could increase the number of possible SIMs by allowing for a base code
order vector and add additional complexity to the exhaustive key search to be discussed in
Section 5.2.3. For now, this is left as an area of future research.
4.2 Gray Code Hopping
This technique involves the same three phases as the previous scheme. The basic elements
of each phase are illustrated in Fig. 4.3. The GCH modulator and demodulator shown in
Fig. 4.3 are the same as those shown in Fig. 3.2. Either implementation may be utilized.
4.2.1 Steady State
During this phase, communication has not yet begun between the BS and UE; however,
it is assumed that each entity has certain a priori knowledge. This includes an original
base mapping vector (v𝑜𝑏𝑚) containing baseline mappings as discussed in Section 2.2.1,
operation limits for each mapping as discussed in Sections 2.2.3 and 3.3, and the unique
contents contained on the UE’s SIM. These unique contents include a base mapping index
vector (v𝑏𝑚𝑖) and a base order of mapping operations vector (v𝑏𝑜𝑚𝑜). The elements of v𝑏𝑚𝑖
are indices for each mapping in v𝑜𝑏𝑚. With this a priori information, both entities are able
to build a unique base mapping vector (v𝑢𝑏𝑚) using the process detailed in Section 3.3. The
elements in v𝑢𝑏𝑚 represent the mappings built by applying operations in the order specified
by v𝑏𝑜𝑚𝑜 to the mappings from v𝑜𝑏𝑚 with corresponding index values from v𝑏𝑚𝑖.


























































































Figure 4.3. Basic elements for each phase of the GCH PLS scheme.
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With this information and corresponding operation limits for 𝑏 = 2, (3.1) is calculated using
v𝑏𝑜𝑚𝑜 in place of v𝑜𝑜 to obtain v𝑑𝑖𝑣 = [1 2], and (3.2) is calculated using v𝑏𝑜𝑚𝑜 in place of
v𝑜𝑜 and v𝑏𝑚𝑖 in place of 𝐼𝑉 to obtain v𝑖𝑡 = [0 3]. Thus, the associated bit permutation is









Note that v𝑢𝑏𝑚 (1) is not equal to BRGC mapping index 7 from Table 2.3 as the two mappings
are constructed with different v𝑜𝑜 despite having the same base mapping and index value.
The SIM also includes a mapping seed obfuscation key (SOK𝑚) used during the next phase
to obfuscate the received seed to minimize any impact of the seed being intercepted. For a
given v𝑜𝑏𝑚, the number of unique combinations of v𝑏𝑚𝑖, v𝑏𝑜𝑚𝑜, and SOK𝑚 with length ofSOK𝑚  bits is used to determine the number of unique SIMs which is
2




S𝑚 (𝑖) is the set cardinality for the 𝑖th base mapping in v𝑜𝑏𝑚.
4.2.2 Initialization
During this phase, it is desired for communication to begin. A random seed is transmitted
from BS to UE using a secret sharing method. Each entity performs modulo-2 addition
between the bits of this random seed and the SOK𝑚 to obtain an obfuscated seed. Each
entity then uses this seed to synchronize PRNGs. Next, PRNs are generated to create a
temporary v𝑏𝑚𝑖 (v𝑡𝑏𝑚𝑖) and temporary order of mapping operations vector (v𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑜) for use




S𝑚 (𝑖)) + 1. (4.24)
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The v𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑜 is set by indexing a row from a permutations array containing the elements from
v𝑏𝑜𝑚𝑜 in lexicographic order, where the row index is set as
row index = (PRN mod 2!) + 1. (4.25)
Example 4.2.2. Set cardinality for the base mapping in (4.19), provided in Table 2.4, is






With v𝑏𝑜𝑚𝑜 given in (4.21) and PRN = 5, 695, 785, 731, 330, 084, the row index = 1 using





Figure 4.4. Illustration of indexing into permutations array containing ele-
ments of v𝑏𝑜𝑚𝑜 in lexicographic order with row index = 1.
With these session variables, v𝑢𝑏𝑚, and operation limits, both entities build a temporary
base mapping vector (v𝑡𝑏𝑚). The BS and UE are now ready to begin data transmission.
Example 4.2.3. Using v𝑢𝑏𝑚 from Example 4.2.1 and the determined session variables from
Example 4.2.2, v𝑑𝑖𝑣 = [1 2] and v𝑖𝑡 = [1 2]; thus, the associated bit permutation is [2 1],











During this phase, the synchronized PRNGs from the initialization phase are used to generate
PRNs in order to determine the next mapping to be used to produce the next modulation
symbol during transmission from BS to UE. If there is more than one base mapping in v𝑜𝑏𝑚,
then it is assumed that the next mapping set (NMS) to be used is determined by some other
means such as the RSSI. This is based on the assumption that the particular modulation
order to be employed is selected as part of a common adaptive modulation coding scheme.




S𝑚 (NMS)) + 1. (4.28)
Using these set and index values, v𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑜, v𝑡𝑏𝑚, and operation limits, BS performs GCH
modulation as discussed in Section 3.4.
Example 4.2.4. For the system in Examples 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.2.3, NMS = 1; thus, v𝑡𝑏𝑚 (1)
is the base mapping to be employed. With the next PRN = 878, 565, 863, 217, 818, (4.28)
is used to calculate NMI = 3. Thus, with v𝑑𝑖𝑣 = [1 2], v𝑖𝑡 = [0 1], the associated bit
permutation is [1 2], and associated bit mask vector is v𝑏𝑚 = 𝑑𝑒2𝑏𝑖(1, 2, 2) = [1 0]. The







The steps described here are repeated for each symbol to be transmitted. If the GCH
modulator given in Fig. 3.2(a) is employed, the next mapping function or LUT is selected
by NMI from a set of mappings built using v𝑡𝑏𝑚 and v𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑜. If the GCH modulator given in
Fig. 3.2(b) is employed, NMI is used in conjunction with v𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑜 to determine the order of
operations, associated bit permutation, and bit mask, and the baseline modulator corresponds
to v𝑡𝑏𝑚. UE performs GCH demodulation of each symbol as discussed in Section 3.4.
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4.3 Combining Techniques
When combining alternating STC and GCH PLS techniques, it must be determined whether
or not they will use the same PRNG. For the purposes of security to be discussed in
Chapter 5, it is better if the two techniques employ separate PRNGs with different seeds.
Additionally, it is recommended that SOK𝑠 ≠ SOK𝑚 to increase the number of unique
SIMs.
For given v𝑜𝑏𝑠 and v𝑜𝑏𝑚 when combining techniques, the SIM unique contents include v𝑏𝑠𝑖,
v𝑏𝑜𝑠𝑜, SOK𝑠, v𝑏𝑚𝑖, v𝑏𝑜𝑚𝑜, and SOK𝑚. Thus, the number of unique SIMs is
2
(SOK𝑠+SOK𝑚 ) · |v𝑏𝑜𝑠𝑜 |! · |v𝑏𝑜𝑚𝑜 |! · |v𝑜𝑏𝑠 |∏
𝑖=1








This chapter includes adaptations from previous work already published or in publication by
the author. Specifically, portions of Section 5.1.4 and 5.2.2 are revised from [8]. Portions of
the introduction and Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 are revised from [9]. Portions of Sections 5.1
and 5.2 are revised from [10]. Portions of Section 5.3 are revised from [11].
Before analyzing the security of the proposed PLS framework, we first define some common
nomenclature for use in characterization of ST coding-based PLS schemes. We then discuss
security offered by the proposed alternating STC technique against two possible passive
eavesdropper attack models. Next, we take a look at the security offered by the proposed
GCH scheme, and finally, we discuss the security benefit of operating the two techniques in
unison.
5.1 Security System Nomenclature
In [13], definitions were provided for a cryptogram, message residue class, and cryptogram
residue class pertaining to secrecy systems in general. These terms are now related to ST
coding-based PLS schemes. Additionally, the notion and definitions for a key residue (KR)
and key residue class (KRC) are provided.
5.1.1 Cryptogram Definition
The cryptogram, E, is defined as the transmitted STC matrix, G, with embedded data symbol
vector, s, containing 𝑘 specific data symbols of the chosen digital modulation scheme.
Example 5.1.1. Given the MPO468 base code shown in (2.3) employing 16QAM with





+1 + 1 𝑗 −3 + 3 𝑗 −3 − 1 𝑗 0
+3 + 3 𝑗 +1 − 1 𝑗 0 +3 + 1 𝑗
+3 − 1 𝑗 0 +1 − 1 𝑗 −3 + 3 𝑗
0 +3 − 1 𝑗 −3 − 3 𝑗 −1 − 1 𝑗
−1 − 1 𝑗 +3 − 3 𝑗 +3 + 1 𝑗 0
−3 − 3 𝑗 −1 + 1 𝑗 0 −3 − 1 𝑗
−3 + 1 𝑗 0 −1 + 1 𝑗 +3 − 3 𝑗
0 −3 + 1 𝑗 +3 + 3 𝑗 +1 + 1 𝑗

. (5.1)
By incorporating PR algorithms with 𝑎 ≥ 3, cryptogram elements are not guaranteed to
be ∈ M of the chosen 𝑀-ary modulation scheme. This is also true for the MPO334 and
MPO434 STCs even without PR algorithms due to weights applied to matrix elements.




𝑠1 · 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/4 −𝑠∗2














2 𝑗 −1 − 1 𝑗
 . (5.3)
Example 5.1.3. Given the MPO334 variant code shown in (3.18) employing 16QAM with
s = [+1 + 1 𝑗 , −3 + 3 𝑗 , −3 − 1 𝑗]𝑇 , the cryptogram is represented as
E =

−1 − 1 𝑗 −3
√
2 𝑗 −1 − 2 𝑗
+3 + 3 𝑗 −
√
















5.1.2 Key Residue Definition
We herein define the KR as the pattern or set of symbol relationships and their matrix
locations within a given STC. For the KR, the particular symbol (e.g., 𝑠1 versus 𝑠2) in each
relationship is irrelevant. The pattern is defined only by the relationship and location of
each symbol element.
We define symbol relationships first as those which exist between the two variants in
any present symbol pair. When both variants are similarly-conjugated, the relationship is
determined by dividing the second variant by the first. When the variants are dissimilarly-
conjugated, the relationship is determined by dividing the second variant by the conjugate
of the entire first variant, including any PR that exists. Note that this is in contrast to the
symbol conjugation algorithm provided in Section 2.1.3 where the conjugation operation
does not get applied to any PRs.
Example 5.1.4. If the first variant is 𝑠1 · 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/4, and the second variant is 𝑠∗1 · 𝑒
𝑗𝜋/2/2, the






𝑗7𝜋/4) = 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/4
2
. (5.5)
The symbol relationship between these two variants is referred to as conjugate 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/4/2.
If all cryptogram elements are guaranteed to be ∈ M of the chosen 𝑀-ary modulation
scheme, symbol relationships could be limited to only those which exist between symbols;
however, as this guarantee does not always hold, symbol relationships must be further defined
to include the PRs, with applicable weighting factors, applied to data symbols within the
reference column(s) of the STC matrix. These PRs are recorded as minimal equivalent,
non-negative PRs obtained by subtracting the maximum number of 𝜋/2 multiples without
obtaining a negative result; thus, all recorded PRs are ∈ [0, 𝜋/2) radians.
For all STCs discussed in this work, the reference column(s) are the leftmost column(s) of
the STC matrix that do not contain summations of terms but collectively contain a variation
of every data symbol within the data symbol vector. For all SMSTCs, every column is a
reference column in order to contain a variation of every data symbol.
Two KR forms are now presented. Several examples of these forms are provided in the
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subsection that follows, and additional KRs are included in Appendix B.
Tabular Form Key Residue
The KR may be represented in tabular form by grouping these relationships together.
Symbol groups that produce a zero inner product are formed first. These groups consist of
one or more symbol relationships for one or more data symbols. Symbol relationships for
the reference column PRs are grouped together last and listed as corresponding complex
exponentials with applicable weighting factors. As these relationships consist of only a
single symbol variant, the symbol location is listed for both variant location 1 and 2. The
tabular form KR is produced by listing the relationship and variant locations of each symbol
relationship, of each data symbol, for all symbol groups within the STC.
Within the tabular form KR, a symbol group index (SGI) is used to abstractly identify the
count of symbol relationships for each data symbol within each symbol group. For instance,
SGI 3.2.1 refers to the first symbol relationship for the second data symbol in the third
symbol group. Whereas the symbol relationship count is unnecessary for many STCs, it is
important for the MPO334 and MPO434 STCs.
Matrix Form Key Residue
A KR may also be represented in matrix form. Given a STC, the matrix form KR may
be determined by performing symbol permutations, symbol PRs, and symbol conjugations.
Each operation is performed as necessary in order to place the unconjugated and minimally-
rotated symbols from the data symbol vector, s, in order from top-to-bottom, left-to-right
within the STC reference column(s). A minimally-rotated symbol is one with a minimal
equivalent, non-negative PR ∈ [0, 𝜋/2) radians as previously described; thus, symbol PRs
performed to achieve this result must be integer multiples of 𝜋/2 radians. Recall within
Algorithm S7 that the symbol conjugation operation does not impact applied PRs.
For consistency with the MPO334 and MPO434 STCs, the symbol in the highest row of the
reference column that does not have a weight of 1/
√
2 is considered 𝑠1, the next like term is
considered 𝑠2, and the terms weighted by 1/
√





Several examples follow to provide further clarification about the defined KR forms. Addi-
tional KR examples are included in Appendix B.
Example 5.1.5. Recall the Alamouti variant code originally given in (5.2) as
G =
[
𝑠1 · 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/4 −𝑠∗2




The tabular form KR of (5.2) is provided in Table 5.1. The matrix form KR of (5.2) is
determined by phase rotating symbol 𝑠1 and is represented as
G𝐾𝑅 =
[
𝑠1 · 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/4 −𝑠∗2
𝑠2 · 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/4 𝑠∗1
]
. (5.6)
Table 5.1. Tabular form KR for the Alamouti variant code shown in (5.2).




1.1.1 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/4 (1, 1) (2, 2)
1.2.1 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗5𝜋/4 (2, 1) (1, 2)
2.1.1 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/4 (1, 1) (1, 1)
2.2.1 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/4 (2, 1) (2, 1)




𝑗21𝜋/16 𝑠∗3 · 𝑒
𝑗15𝜋/16 𝑠2 · 𝑒 𝑗49𝜋/32 𝑠∗1 · 𝑒
𝑗57𝜋/32
𝑠∗2 · 𝑒
𝑗3𝜋/2 𝑠1 · 𝑒 𝑗39𝜋/32 𝑠4 · 𝑒 𝑗23𝜋/32 𝑠3 · 𝑒 𝑗17𝜋/16
]
.
The tabular form KR of (3.30) is provided in Table 5.2. Note the two leftmost columns are
the reference columns for this code. The matrix form KR of (3.30) is determined by phase
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rotating all symbols, conjugating all symbols except for 𝑠1, and permuting symbols 𝑠1 and
𝑠4. The matrix form KR is represented as
G𝐾𝑅 =
[
𝑠1 · 𝑒 𝑗5𝜋/16 𝑠3 · 𝑒 𝑗7𝜋/16 𝑠∗2 · 𝑒
𝑗33𝜋/32 𝑠∗4 · 𝑒
𝑗25𝜋/32
𝑠2 𝑠4 · 𝑒 𝑗7𝜋/32 𝑠∗1 · 𝑒




Table 5.2. Tabular form KR for the NO442 variant code shown in (3.30).




1.1.1 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/32 (1, 1) (2, 3)
1.2.1 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗33𝜋/32 (2, 1) (1, 3)
2.1.1 Conj. (1, 2) (2, 4)
2.2.1 Conj. −1 (2, 2) (1, 4)
3.1.1 𝑒 𝑗5𝜋/16 (1, 1) (1, 1)
3.2.1 1 (2, 1) (2, 1)
3.3.1 𝑒 𝑗7𝜋/16 (1, 2) (1, 2)
3.4.1 𝑒 𝑗7𝜋/32 (2, 2) (2, 2)
Example 5.1.7. Recall the SM221 variant code originally given in (3.21) as
G =
[
𝑠2 · 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/8 𝑠∗1 · 𝑒
𝑗5𝜋/32] .
The tabular form KR of (3.21) is provided in Table 5.3. The matrix form KR of (3.21) is
determined by conjugating 𝑠1 and permuting symbols 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 and is represented as
G𝐾𝑅 =
[




Table 5.3. Tabular form KR for the SM221 variant code shown in (3.21).




1.1.1 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/8 (1, 1) (1, 1)
1.2.1 𝑒 𝑗5𝜋/32 (1, 2) (1, 2)
5.1.3 Key Residue Class Definition
In [68], the term KRC was used to refer to keys which act similarly and may be indistin-
guishable under certain conditions. Whereas this usage of the term is compatible with STC
PLS schemes, [68] adds that when the KRC is known, the message is also known. As this
latter statement is not true for our purposes, we provide a more complete definition of KRC
as it pertains to ST coding-based PLS schemes.
The KRC is a subset of the full code set consisting of all “keys,” or STCs, sharing the same
KR. All KRCs are of equal size and collectively partition the full code set for any given
STC. The KRC size when 𝑎 = 1 is given as
|𝐾𝑅𝐶 | = 4𝑘 · 𝑘!. (5.9)
The KRC size for any given STC depends on the number of data symbols per codeword and
the number of allowed symbol PRs that may be performed without changing the associated
KR. From the definition given in the previous subsection, all 𝑘! symbol permutations and
2𝑘 symbol conjugations may be performed without affecting the KR. The number of symbol
PRs permitted depends on the value of 𝑎. When 𝑎 = 1, only 0 and 𝜋 radian PRs are allowed
for each symbol; however, when 𝑎 ≥ 2, all symbols may be phase-rotated by 0, 𝜋/2, 𝜋, or
3𝜋/2 radians without changing the associated KR.
Thus, for any value of 𝑎, KRC size is given as
|𝐾𝑅𝐶 | = 2𝑘 (min(𝑎, 2)+1) · 𝑘!, (5.10)
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where min(𝑎, 2) represents the standard minimum operation between 𝑎 and 2.
For all base STCs given in Section 2.1.1, it can be seen that the number of KRCs increases
as the value of 𝑎 increases by dividing the corresponding full set cardinality given in (2.17)
or (2.18) as applicable by the KRC size in (5.10). Table 5.4 provides the number of KRCs
for each base STC when incorporating PR algorithms with various values of 𝑎.
5.1.4 Message and Cryptogram Residue Class Definition
From [13], a message residue class is defined as the set of messages that might have
produced a given cryptogram. Also, from [13], a cryptogram residue class is defined as
the set of cryptograms that may be produced from a given message. We supplement these
definitions by adding our cryptogram definition, clarifying that the message is the embedded
data symbol vector for a STC, and adding a KRC caveat to the cryptogram residue class
definition.
A message residue class is defined herein as the set of data symbol vectors that might have
produced a given cryptogram. Similarly, a cryptogram residue class is the set of cryptograms
that may be produced from a given data symbol vector by employing only those STCs from
a single KRC. This caveat regarding the KRC is important as each KRC has different
cryptogram residue classes matching the KR for that class.










where 𝑢 is the number of unique symbol sets (USSs) represented in each data symbol
vector of the message residue class, and n𝑠 = [𝑛𝑠1 . . . 𝑛𝑠𝑢 ]𝑇 is a 𝑢-by-1 column vector



































































































































































































































































































































When 𝑎 = 1, a USS is a set of four symbols within the chosen modulation scheme equal
to the original, negative, conjugate, or negative-conjugate of one another. It is this set of
equalities that results in the 4𝑘 term in (5.11) [9]. For any modulation scheme of order 𝑀
with constellation exhibiting bilateral symmetry across both the real and imaginary axes,
the number of USSs when 𝑎 = 1 is equal to 𝑀/4. As a point of reference, the USSs for the
16QAM scheme when 𝑎 = 1 are shown with differing colors and shapes in Fig. 5.1.


















Figure 5.1. Illustration of USSs within the 16QAM scheme when 𝑎 = 1.
Employing PR algorithms with 𝑎 ≥ 2 introduces additional equalities requiring the USS
definition to be revised. Thus, when 𝑎 ≥ 2, a USS is herein defined as a set of symbols
within the chosen modulation scheme equal to the original or conjugate of one another
phase-rotated by an integer multiple of 𝜋/2 radians. This affects the 4𝑘 term in (5.11) and
the 𝑢 variable and elements of n𝑠 within the 𝑓 metric.
As a point of reference, symbols belonging to each USS for the 64QAM scheme when
𝑎 ≥ 2 are shown in Fig. 5.2 with colors representing the number of symbols within each
set. Constant energy rings are added as an aid to the reader. The two USSs on the red and
blue dashed energy ring are separated due to this revised USS definition.
Thus, when 𝑎 ≥ 2, the 4𝑘 term in (5.11) must be replaced by the product of the number
of symbols within the USS of each symbol in the data symbol vector. Performing this
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Figure 5.2. Illustration of USSs within the 64QAM scheme when 𝑎 ≥ 2.







where |𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑙 | represents the number of symbols contained within 𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑙 , and 𝑢 and n𝑠 are
as previously defined in (5.12).
For convenience, the terms in (5.13) that change for different residue classes are grouped








𝜙𝑖 = 𝑄 𝑓 · 𝑘!. (5.15)
To understand how the repetition metric, 𝑓 , is affected by incorporation of PR algorithms
with 𝑎 ≥ 2 and its relation to 𝑄 𝑓 , we review the properties of message and cryptogram
residue classes within a pure cipher system [13]. When employing only the STCs from a
single KRC of a chosen STC, it can be shown that the message and cryptogram residue
classes meet the properties for those of a pure cipher system in [13, Theorem 3]. A summary
and adaptation of these properties is provided here:
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Property 1 ) Message residue classes C1, C2, etc. collectively form a partition of the data
symbol vector space for a given digital modulation scheme. Similarly for the
cryptogram residue classes C′1, C
′
2, etc.
Property 2 ) Embedding any data symbol vector in C𝑖 within any STC of the chosen KRC
produces a cryptogram in C′
𝑖
. Decoding any cryptogram in C′
𝑖
with any STC
of the chosen KRC leads to a data symbol vector in C𝑖.
Property 3 ) The number of data symbol vectors in C𝑖, say 𝜙𝑖, is equal to the number of
cryptograms in C′
𝑖
and is a divisor of the number of STCs in the chosen KRC.
Property 4 ) Each data symbol vector in C𝑖 can be embedded within exactly 𝑓 different STCs
of the chosen KRC to produce each cryptogram in C′
𝑖






Substituting (5.10) for |𝐾𝑅𝐶 | and (5.15) for 𝜙𝑖 in (5.16) yields
𝑓 =
2𝑘 (min(𝑎, 2)+1) · 𝑘!











When 𝑎 = 1, each USS contains four symbols. For this case, it can be seen how (5.17) is
equal to (5.12).
5.1.5 Residue Classes for the Alamouti STC
To better understand the message and cryptogram residue classes pertaining to STC PLS
schemes, we now examine these classes for the Alamouti STC employing 16QAM data
symbols and only the STCs from one of its two KRCs with 𝑎 = 1. For each message and
cryptogram residue class, with 𝑘 = 2 and 𝑀 = 16, either 𝑢 = 1 or 𝑢 = 2 leading to n𝑠 = [2]
or n𝑠 = [1 1]𝑇 , respectively; thus, under these conditions, the repetition metric for all
message and cryptogram residue classes is either 𝑓 = 2 or 𝑓 = 1. Note that 2 = 𝑘! in this
case.
For any chosen base code with 𝑎 = 1, the number of data symbol vectors collectively
contained within all message residue classes with a repetition metric of 𝑓 = 𝑘! can easily
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be understood by determining the number of potential data symbol vectors that may be
produced by selecting all 𝑘 data symbols from within a single USS. This selection process
can be further explained as selecting any of the 𝑀 modulation symbols to be the first data
symbol followed by selecting any of the 4 variations (e.g., original, negative, conjugate, or
negative-conjugate) of the first modulation symbol for the remaining 𝑘 − 1 data symbols.
By this process, there are
𝑀 · 4𝑘−1 (5.18)
data symbol vectors within message residue classes with 𝑓 = 𝑘!. By substituting 𝑘! for 𝑓












message residue classes and associated cryptogram residue classes with a repetition metric
of 𝑓 = 𝑘!. This is an intuitive solution as each of these classes represents the set of all data
symbol vectors that can be produced by selecting all 𝑘 data symbols from within a single
USS. As there are 𝑀/4 USSs when 𝑎 = 1, there are 𝑀/4 message and cryptogram residue
classes with 𝑓 = 𝑘!.
For the Alamouti STC employing 16QAM data symbols with 𝑎 = 1, there are 16/4 = 4
classes with a repetition metric of 𝑓 = 2. Fig. 5.3 shows a template for these classes
with the following variable definitions. Since there are 4 classes based on this template
with 𝜙𝑖 = 4𝑘 = 16 data symbol vectors and cryptograms in each class, 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},
𝑙 = 16 · (𝑖 − 1) + 1, 𝑜 = 𝑙 + 15, and 𝑙 < 𝑛 < 𝑜. The multi-colored lines connecting each
data symbol vector on the left-hand side to a cryptogram on the right-hand side represent 6
of the 32 STCs within the chosen KRC. The particular colors serve to aid in distinguishing
between different STCs, to illustrate properties 2 and 4 for the message and cryptogram
residue classes of a pure cipher system given in Section 5.1.4, and to illustrate that a given
STC cannot produce a cryptogram in C′
𝑖
from more than one data symbol vector in C𝑖. Any
other pattern or relation that can be found within the chosen colors is unintended and does
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not represent a known property of these classes.
𝐂!
𝐬" # # 𝐄"
⋮ ⋮
𝐬# # # 𝐄#
⋮ ⋮
𝐬$ # # 𝐄$
𝐂!%
Figure 5.3. Template for Alamouti message and cryptogram residue classes
with 𝑓 = 2 employing 16QAM data symbols and STCs from a single KRC
with 𝑎 = 1. Adapted from [13].
For any chosen base code with 𝑎 = 1, the number of data symbol vectors collectively
contained within all message residue classes with a repetition metric of 𝑓 = 1 can be
understood as the set of all data symbol vectors produced by selecting all 𝑘 data symbols
from different USSs. For 𝑎 = 1, this is only possible when 𝑘 < 𝑀/4. Given these conditions
are met, there are
𝑘−1∏
𝑙=0
(𝑀 − 4 · 𝑙) (5.21)
data symbol vectors within message residue classes with a repetition metric of 𝑓 = 1. By




= 4𝑘 · 𝑘! (5.22)
data symbol vectors in each of these classes.
For the Alamouti STC employing 16QAM data symbols with 𝑎 = 1, dividing (5.21) by
(5.22) provides that there are







message residue classes and associated cryptogram residue classes with a repetition metric
of 𝑓 = 1. Fig. 5.4 shows a template for these classes with the following variable definitions.
Since there are 6 classes based on this template with 𝜙𝑖 = 4𝑘 · 𝑘! = 32 data symbol
vectors and cryptograms in each class, and 4 previously defined classes with 𝑓 = 2 with a
total of 4 · 16 = 64 data symbol vectors and cryptograms combined, 𝑖 ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10},
𝑙 = 32 · (𝑖 − 5) + 65, 𝑜 = 𝑙 + 31, and 𝑙 < 𝑛 < 𝑜. The multi-colored lines serve the same
purpose as those in Fig. 5.3.
𝐂!
𝐬" # # 𝐄"
⋮ ⋮
𝐬# # # 𝐄#
⋮ ⋮
𝐬$ # # 𝐄$
𝐂!%
Figure 5.4. Template for Alamouti message and cryptogram residue classes
with 𝑓 = 1 employing 16QAM data symbols and STCs from a single KRC
with 𝑎 = 1. Adapted from [13].
It can be seen that property 1 in Section 5.1.4 is confirmed as these ten message residue
classes collectively partition the data symbol vector space for the Alamouti STC employing
16QAM with a total of 𝑀 𝑘 = 162 = 256 data symbol vectors. Likewise for the cryptogram
space matching the KR of the chosen KRC.
5.2 Alternating Space-Time Code Security
We now use established nomenclature to analyze the security offered by the proposed
alternating STC PLS scheme from Section 4.1 against two possible attack models. The
communications link described in Section 3.2.1 is used as the basis for this discussion
in conjunction with the proposed scheme with 𝑎 = 9 and v𝑜𝑏𝑠 = [Alamouti]. GCH is
not employed at this time. After presentation of security offered by only a single-STC
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implementation, we will expound on differences by moving to a multi-STC implementation,
but first we list the assumptions made about the eavesdropper.
5.2.1 Eavesdropper Assumptions
It is assumed that Eve:
• has a priori knowledge of the chosen v𝑜𝑏𝑠, value of 𝑎 indicating allowed number of
PRs, and digital modulation scheme employed,
• may have a priori knowledge of some PT data,
• employs 𝑁𝑅𝐸 RX antennas,
• has perfect CSI of the channel between BS and Eve denoted by the 𝑐-by-𝑁𝑅𝐸 channel
tap array h𝐵𝐸 ,
• has perfect timing synchronization,
• passively records all received data samples for an entire communications session,
• and has the ability to generate the matrix form KR, G𝐾𝑅, associated with all KRCs
for the chosen v𝑜𝑏𝑠.
5.2.2 Key Residue Class Decoding
The first attack model is referred to as KRC decoding which attempts to determine the
transmitted data frame using similarities between the STCs within a KRC. This involves
gaining information about the embedded data symbol vector and STC employed for each
codeword from the recorded sample array, Z, and then using this information to search for
the correct data frame. We first describe the process Eve may take to gain this information,
and then we discuss the data frame search. Finally, we discuss the expected eavesdropper
BER that may be achieved when employing this attack.
Given the previous non-trivial assumptions, Eve performs the following steps [9]:
Step 1 ) For each KRC of the v𝑜𝑏𝑠, use G𝐾𝑅 along with channel tap array, h𝐵𝐸 , to determine
the corresponding matrix, H𝐶𝐵𝐸 , necessary for the applicable decoding method to
be employed from Section 3.2.
Step 2 ) Perform decoding method of the received sample array using the H𝐶𝐵𝐸 matrix
associated with each KRC to obtain results, ŝ𝑖 for 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑙} where 𝑙 is the
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number of KRCs.
Step 3 ) Determine the KRC to which the STC used for transmission of the cryptogram
belongs. This is performed by finding the index value, 𝑖, of the result, ŝ𝑖, with
the minimum Euclidean distance to any one of the potential data symbol vectors,









Step 4 ) Obtain a coded symbol vector, s𝑐, by selecting the data symbol vector, s, with the




𝑑 (s, ŝ𝑖). (5.25)
From this point forward, the worst case is analyzed by assuming that Eve has been able
to successfully obtain a coded symbol vector within the correct message residue class for
each codeword of the entire recorded communications session. Likewise, it is assumed
that Eve has successfully determined the correct KRC for each codeword. Although this
requires a substantial amount of work, this case is possible with the assumptions provided
in Section 5.2.1 validated with sufficient SNR, substantial amount of time and computing
resources. The second assumption is evaluated in Chapter 6.
Message Equivocation
Once the coded symbol vector, s𝑐, within the correct message residue class has been ob-
tained, the amount of uncertainty remaining about the transmitted data symbol vector within
each codeword is referred to as the equivocation of the message [13]. This is represented as
𝐻 (s|s𝑐) = log2
(
𝑄 𝑓 · 𝑘!
)
, (5.26)
where 𝑄 𝑓 · 𝑘! is the size of the message residue class to which the coded symbol vector
belongs [9]. Given a particular coded symbol vector,𝑄 𝑓 may be calculated using (5.14) and
inserted into (5.26) to determine message equivocation.
To calculate the mean and upper bounds (UBs) on message equivocation, the probability
mass function of 𝑄 𝑓 is required for all modulations evaluated. These functions are empir-
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ically derived by first calculating 𝑄 𝑓 , according to (5.14), for all 𝑀 𝑘 possible data symbol
vectors for a given 𝑀-order modulation scheme and value of 𝑘 . Assuming equally probable
data symbol vectors, the probability of each 𝑄 𝑓 value is calculated by counting the number
of vectors resulting in each value and dividing that count by the total number of vectors,
𝑀 𝑘 . These mass functions and mean value of𝑄 𝑓 for 16QAM, 64QAM, and 256QAM with
𝑘 = 2 are provided in Figs. 5.5 - 5.7.
Figure 5.5. Probability mass function of the 𝑄 𝑓 metric for 16QAM with
𝑘 = 2.
Figure 5.6. Probability mass function of the 𝑄 𝑓 metric for 64QAM with
𝑘 = 2.
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Figure 5.7. Probability mass function of the 𝑄 𝑓 metric for 256QAM with
𝑘 = 2.
For all modulations evaluated, all USSs contain at least four symbols. Thus, the lower
bound (LB) on message equivocation occurs when 𝑄 𝑓 = 4𝑘/𝑘!. This is the case when a
coded symbol vector contains 𝑘 symbols from a single USS with |𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑙 | = 4. This is always
true for QPSK. Mean, UB, and LB values of message equivocation for various STCs with
𝑘 symbols per codeword employing various modulations can be seen in Fig. 5.8.
The amount of information Eve gains about the message by obtaining s𝑐 is the mutual
information between s and s𝑐, represented as
𝐼 (s; s𝑐) = 𝐻 (s) − 𝐻 (s|s𝑐)
= 𝑘 · log2(𝑀) − log2
(




where 𝐻 (s) is the entropy in s before obtaining s𝑐 which is equal to the number of bits
per codeword [9], [13]. When QPSK is used, 𝑀 = 4, 𝑄 𝑓 = 4𝑘/𝑘!, 𝐼 (s; s𝑐) = 0, and Eve
gains no information about the message by obtaining the coded symbol vector. Mean, UB,
and LB values of this mutual information for various STCs with 𝑘 symbols per codeword
employing various modulations can be seen in Fig. 5.9.
Key Equivocation
Once the correct KRC is determined for a given codeword, the KR associated with that KRC
(i.e., G𝐾𝑅) is readily available. The amount of uncertainty remaining about the STC used
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Figure 5.8. Message equivocation given STCs with various number of data
symbols per codeword and modulation schemes.
for transmission of each cryptogram is called the equivocation of the key [13]. In this case,
key equivocation depends only on the KRC size as given in (5.10). Thus, key equivocation
is represented as
𝐻 (G|G𝐾𝑅) = log2(2𝑘 (min(𝑎, 2)+1) · 𝑘!). (5.28)
The amount of information Eve gains about the key by obtaining the KR is the mutual
information between G and G𝐾𝑅, represented as
𝐼 (G; G𝐾𝑅) = 𝐻 (G) − 𝐻 (G|G𝐾𝑅), (5.29)
where
𝐻 (G) = log2(
S𝑠) (5.30)
is the entropy in G before obtaining the KR in bits. 𝐻 (G) depends on the set cardinality
92
Figure 5.9. Mutual information between s and s𝑐 given STCs with various
number of data symbols per codeword and modulation schemes.
which depends on the STC chosen and the value of 𝑎. For various base STCs given in
Section 2.1.1 with 𝑎 = 9, the values of 𝐻 (G), 𝐻 (G|G𝐾𝑅), and 𝐼 (G; G𝐾𝑅) are provided in
Table 5.5.
Attack Analysis
After gathering information for every recorded codeword, Eve may use the key and message
equivocation to search for the correct transmitted data frame.
If a static STC from the set is employed throughout the entire recorded communications
session rather than alternating the STC as proposed, Eve could relatively easily obtain the
correct data frame using the key equivocation. After performing the initial four step approach
of this attack for only a few codewords, Eve could determine the KRC of the employed STC
with confidence. Upon determination of the KRC, the correct data frame is one of |KRC|
possibilities corresponding to the outputs produced by performing the applicable decoding
method of all received codewords for all STCs within the determined KRC.
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Table 5.5. Entropy in G, key equivocation, and mutual information between
G and G𝐾𝑅 in bits for various STCs with 𝑎 = 9
STC 𝐻 (G) 𝐻 (G|G𝐾𝑅) 𝐼 (G; G𝐾𝑅)
Alamouti 30.0 7.0 23.0
SPO334 64.2 11.6 52.6
MPO468 146.8 27.5 119.3
MPO334 73.8 11.6 62.2
MPO434 83.8 11.6 72.2
SM221 21.0 7.0 14.0
NO442 64.2 16.6 47.6
In this case with a static STC employed, having known PT could further reduce the number
of possible data frames down to the repetition metric, 𝑓 , as shown in (5.17). The value
of the repetition metric depends on the data symbol vectors contained within the known
PT portion of the transmission. This would require solving for the transmitted cryptogram
from the received sample array and determining the 𝑓 STCs within the KRC capable of
producing the transmitted cryptogram from the known data symbol vector.
The complexity of the KRC decoding attack increases exponentially by employing the
proposed alternating STC scheme. Without knowledge of the SIM unique contents and a
synchronized PRNG, selection of the STC used for transmission of each codeword appears
to be independent from the perspective of the eavesdropper. Thus, Eve could search for
the correct data frame using the message equivocation instead of the key equivocation.
This search involves all possible combinations of the 𝜙𝑖 unique data symbol vectors in the
determined message residue class of each received codeword. For a frame of 𝑛 codewords
when using this approach, the correct data frame is one of (𝐸 [𝜙𝑖])𝑛 possible combinations,
where 𝐸 [𝜙𝑖] = 𝐸 [𝑄 𝑓 ] · 𝑘! and 𝐸 [ ] is the expectation operator.
Example 5.2.1. For a single data frame of length corresponding to a common ethernet
maximum frame length of 1, 518 bytes [69], the number of codewords and possible output
frame combinations when attempting to search for the correct data frame using the message
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equivocation of each codeword is shown in Table 5.6 for various modulations employing
the proposed scheme with 𝑎 ≥ 2 and v𝑜𝑏𝑠 = [Alamouti]. The values of 𝐸 [𝑄 𝑓 ] for 16QAM,
64QAM, and 256QAM can be seen in Figs. 5.5 - 5.7. When QPSK is employed, 𝐸 [𝑄 𝑓 ] is
deterministic as QPSK has only a single USS containing all four symbols; thus,𝑄 𝑓 = 4𝑘/𝑘!.
Table 5.6. Number of codewords and possible output frame combinations
for a given frame length when performing a search using the message equiv-
ocation of each codeword.
Modulation 𝐸 [𝑄 𝑓 ] 𝐸 [𝜙𝑖] # Codewords Possible Combinations
QPSK 8 16 3036 5.11 · 103655 = 21518·8
16QAM 27 54 1518 5.94 · 102629
64QAM 45.875 91.75 1012 1.44 · 101986
256QAM 55.359 110.718 759 3.64 · 101551
In this case with an alternating STC, having known PT yields little benefit as Eve is unable
to determine the NSIs corresponding to the STCs used to transmit the known data. Without
knowledge of the NSIs, v𝑡𝑏𝑠, and v𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑜, Eve is unable to improve upon the search complexity
for the codewords received either before or after the known PT portion of the transmission.
Expected Eavesdropper Bit Error Rate
For this attack, if Eve chooses to forgo the frame search process and instead attempts to
obtain an estimate of the data symbol vector, ŝ, from the coded symbol vector, s𝑐, for
each codeword, we can determine the expected BER Eve will achieve. Again, this employs
the worst-case assumption that Eve has obtained a coded symbol vector from the correct
message residue class for each codeword.
In order for Eve to obtain an estimate of the data symbol vector, Eve has two equivalent
techniques available to decode s𝑐. First, Eve could create the message residue class to
which the coded symbol vector belongs and randomly select one of the data symbol vectors
from the class to be ŝ as they are all equally probable. Alternatively, ŝ may be obtained
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by performing symbol assignment and variation decision operations to decode s𝑐. The
amount of uncertainty in either decoding process is equivalent and represented in (5.26).
To determine the expected BER, we further describe the latter decoding technique.
Symbol assignment is performed by assigning each of the symbols in s𝑐 to a given data
symbol in ŝ. There are 𝑘! permutations of performing symbol assignment. The number of











𝑘 − 𝑙 ≥ 2. (5.31b)
0 otherwise (5.31c)
Variation decision is performed for each symbol in s𝑐 by deciding which of the symbols
contained within the corresponding USS should be inserted into ŝ for the assigned symbol.
As each symbol within the USS is equally probable to have produced the corresponding
symbol in s𝑐, Eve decides on a symbol at random. When 𝑎 = 1, there are four symbols
within each USS, and thus there are four possible variation decisions for each symbol. When
𝑎 ≥ 2, the number of possible variation decisions for a given symbol from s𝑐 is dependent
on the number of symbols within the particular USS to which that symbol belongs.
Applying this decoding technique, we calculate Eve’s expected BER as
𝐸 [BER] = 𝐸 [𝑙 |𝑘] · 𝐸 [𝐵𝑐𝑎] + (𝑘 − 𝐸 [𝑙 |𝑘]) · 𝐸 [𝐵𝑖𝑎]
𝑘 · 𝑏 , (5.32)
where 𝐸 [ ] is the expectation operator, 𝑙 is the number of correctly assigned symbols per
codeword, 𝑘 is the number of symbols per codeword, 𝐵𝑐𝑎 is the number of bit errors per
correctly assigned symbol, 𝐵𝑖𝑎 is the number of bit errors per incorrectly assigned symbol,
𝑏 = log2(𝑀) is the number of bits per symbol, and 𝑀 is the order of the digital modulation
scheme employed.
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The expected value of 𝑙 given 𝑘 , can be calculated as
𝐸 [𝑙 |𝑘] =
𝑘∑︁
𝑙=0
𝑙 · 𝑃(𝑙 |𝑘), (5.33)
where
𝑃(𝑙 |𝑘) = Perms(𝑙, 𝑘)
𝑘!
(5.34)
is the probability of 𝑙 given 𝑘 , assuming each permutation is equally probable. Substituting
(5.31) into (5.34), (5.34) into (5.33), and removing the 𝑙 = 0 and 𝑙 = 𝑘 − 1 cases as they
always evaluate to 0 results in
𝐸 [𝑙 |𝑘] =














𝑘 > 2. (5.35b)
It can be shown that evaluating (5.35) for any value of 𝑘 yields 𝐸 [𝑙 |𝑘] = 1.
Assuming codeword symbols are independent of one another, we know that 𝐸 [𝐵𝑖𝑎] = 𝑏/2.
When 𝑎 = 1, 𝐸 [𝐵𝑐𝑎] = 1 based on the average of the four possible variation decisions for
any common BRGC modulation mapping. When 𝑎 ≥ 2, 𝐸 [𝐵𝑐𝑎] is empirically determined
by calculating the expected number of bit errors when demodulating each symbol within
each USS by every other symbol within the same USS and averaging results across all
symbols within the chosen modulation scheme. This assumes modulation symbols are
equally probable. These empirical results for various 5G NR modulations employing bit
mappings specified in [56] are provided in Table 5.7.
Inserting stated values for 𝐸 [𝑙 |𝑘] and 𝐸 [𝐵𝑖𝑎] into (5.32) yields
𝐸 [BER] =
1 · 𝐸 [𝐵𝑐𝑎] + (𝑘 − 1) · 𝑏2
𝑘 · 𝑏 . (5.36)
This represents the average expected eavesdropper BER for all message residue classes once
the eavesdropper has obtained a coded symbol vector within the correct message residue
class. A plot of (5.36) for various STCs with 𝑘 symbols per codeword employing various
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Table 5.7. Expected number of bit errors per correctly assigned symbol for






modulation schemes with corresponding values of 𝐸 [𝐵𝑐𝑎] from Table 5.7 can be seen in
Fig. 5.10.
Additionally, 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations are performed for the Alamouti, SPO334,
and MPO468 STCs employing QPSK, 16QAM, 64QAM, and 256QAM with energy per bit
to noise power spectral density ratio (Eb/N0) values of 5, 10, 15, and 20 dB, respectively.
For each simulation, the worst-case assumption that Eve has obtained a coded symbol vector
within the correct message residue class is enforced. The results of these simulations are
included in Fig. 5.10.
5.2.3 Exhaustive Key Search
Whereas the KRC decoding attack complexity increases exponentially with the data frame
length and is dependent on the employed modulation scheme, the complexity of the ex-
haustive key search attack is independent of these factors [70]. For a transmission longer
than only a few codewords, the least complex attack on the alternating STC PLS scheme,
to our knowledge, is for Eve to perform the exhaustive key search. This attack involves
performing a brute force search for the v𝑡𝑏𝑠, v𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑜, and PRNG state at the beginning of
the data transmission phase. This is based on a reasonable assumption that every unique
combination of these variables yields a unique sequence of alternative STCs for a commu-
nications session of a given length. Exhaustive validation of this assumption depends upon
the PRNG implementation and length of communications session and is left as an area of
future research.
98
Figure 5.10. Theoretical plot of (5.36) with various number of data symbols
per codeword and modulation schemes including high SNR Monte Carlo
simulations for the Alamouti, SPO334, and MPO468 STCs.
The complexity of this attack depends on the number of possibilities for each of these
variables. Assuming that the seed space of the employed PRNG in bits is equal to |SOK𝑠 |
and that Eve knows the chosen system v𝑜𝑏𝑠, the number of possible combinations that must
be searched is equal to the number of unique SIMs given in (4.7).
Using this attack method, the correct data frame is the decoding result of one of these
possible combinations. The number of combinations for a few example systems with PRNG
seed space equal to |SOK𝑠 | = 64 bits, variable values of 𝑎 and v𝑜𝑏𝑠 are provided in
Table 5.8 for comparison. For Systems A and B when Alamouti is the only employed STC,
|v𝑏𝑜𝑠𝑜 | = |v𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑜 | = 5 since symbol PRs and symbol permutations are not allowed for that
STC; however, |v𝑏𝑜𝑠𝑜 | = 7 for all remaining systems. Attack complexity in bits is calculated
by taking the base two logarithm of the possible combinations and rounding up to the nearest
bit.
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Table 5.8. Exhaustive key search attack complexity for alternating STC PLS
based on number of possible combinations for a few example systems.




A 1 [Alamouti] 1.42 · 1023 77
B 9 [Alamouti] 2.38 · 1030 101
C 1 [MPO468] 7.08 · 1035 120
D 9 [MPO468] 1.44 · 1067 224
E 1 [Alamouti SPO334 MPO468] 3.34 · 1042 142
F 9 [Alamouti SPO334 MPO468] 3.20 · 1095 318
G 1 [MPO468 NO442 SM441] 3.20 · 1044 148
H 9 [MPO468 NO442 SM441] 7.86 · 1099 332
5.2.4 Single versus Multi-Space-Time Code Security
Although the KRC decoding attack was previously only discussed for a single-STC imple-
mentation, it can be seen by comparing Tables 5.6 and 5.8 that the exhaustive key search
attack is significantly less complex. The exhaustive key search attack for a multi-STC im-
plementation, such as with system F, is even less complex than the KRC decoding attack on
the single-STC system evaluated. Performing the KRC decoding attack on system F would
be substantially more difficult as Eve would first have to determine the specific STC set
being used for each codeword. Thus, the security offered by single- and multi-STC systems
is considered to be based on the exhaustive key search attack complexity.
5.3 Gray Code Hopping Security
In order to discuss the security provided by the proposed GCH technique, we start by making
assumptions about the eavesdropper’s attack methodology. It is assumed that Eve:
• has a priori knowledge of the modulation order in use,
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• may have a priori knowledge of some PT data,
• has perfect CSI of the channel between BS and Eve,
• passively records all received data samples for an entire communications session,
• and is aware that GCH is being employed.
As a worst-case scenario, it is further assumed that Eve is able to obtain the correct
transmitted constellation symbol for every symbol received throughout the entire recorded
communications session.
5.3.1 Information-Theoretic Analysis
Given these assumptions, the only uncertainty remaining are the data bits that correspond
to each of the received constellation symbols. As stated in Section 2.2.2, it can be shown
that there are 𝑏! BRGC mappings that pair each of the constellation symbols with each
of the binary labels. Thus, assuming that each BRGC mapping is equally probable when
employing the GCH scheme, Eve gains no information about the data bits by determining the
correct transmitted symbol. The amount of uncertainty remaining about the data bits given
the constellation symbol, referred to as the equivocation of the message [13], is represented
as
𝐻 (𝑚 |𝑠) = log2(𝑀) = 𝑏. (5.37)
Since this is equal to the uncertainty of the data bits prior to receiving the constellation
symbol, 𝐻 (𝑚), perfect secrecy is attained by the GCH scheme [13]. Likewise, since every
mapping contains every symbol, the amount of uncertainty remaining about the mapping
in use given the constellation symbol, referred to as the equivocation of the key [13], is
represented as
𝐻 (B𝑚 |𝑠) = log2(2𝑏 · 𝑏!). (5.38)
Thus, no information about the mapping is available given the constellation symbol alone.
If Eve has a priori knowledge of some PT data, then the mapping employed to create
each corresponding symbol is known to be one of the 𝑏! mappings that pairs the received
symbol with the known PT data. As these mappings are equally probable, uncertainty of
the mapping in use for each of these symbols is reduced, but not eliminated, and can be
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represented as
𝐻 (B𝑚 |𝑠 and known PT) = log2(𝑏!). (5.39)
Depending on the amount of known PT and specific implementation, Eve may be able to
find an attack on the hopping sequence. Assuming this is not possible as assumed in [21],
this reduced uncertainty for the mapping used with known PT data provides no information
about the mapping in use before or after the known PT portion of the attack.
Comparison to Other Constellation Remapping Schemes
Perfect secrecy can also be achieved by the constellation remapping schemes presented
in [16]–[18]; however, as discussed in Section 1.1.2, each of these schemes is more sus-
ceptible to a known PT attack than GCH due to the use of a static mapping throughout the
communications session.
When only 2𝑏 = 𝑀 alternative mappings are employed in a static fashion as discussed
in [16] and [17], only a single symbol of known PT is required for Eve to determine the
static mapping in use and decode the entire recorded session. Alternatively, when all 𝑀!
possible mappings are employed in a static fashion as discussed in [18], 𝑀 − 1 unique
symbols from the constellation corresponding to known PT data must be received before
the static mapping is determined and the entire recorded session may be decoded.
If these other schemes are modified to alternate the mapping in use as with GCH, techniques
[16] and [17] are more susceptible to combined known PT and hopping sequence attacks
than GCH due to the lesser number of alternative mappings. Alternating CD-PHY from [18]
would yield greater uncertainty than GCH about the mapping in use for each of the known
PT symbols; however, as discussed in Section 1.1.2, CD-PHY comes at a cost of reduced
BER performance between the transmitter and intended receiver.
5.3.2 Exhaustive Key Search
Similar to the exhaustive key search attack for the alternating STC PLS scheme, Eve may
also attempt this attack on the GCH scheme. This attack involves performing a brute force
search for the v𝑡𝑏𝑚, v𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑜, and PRNG state at the beginning of the data transmission phase.
This is based on a reasonable assumption that every unique combination of these variables
yields a unique sequence of mappings for a communications session of a given length.
102
Again, exhaustive validation of this assumption depends upon the PRNG implementation
and length of communications session and is left as an area of future research.
Unlike the alternating STC scheme, it is assumed that only a single modulation order is in
use throughout a communications session for the purpose of this discussion. This is not a
limitation of the proposed GCH scheme but an imposed assumption for evaluation of attack
complexity. If an adaptive modulation coding scheme is employed, Eve would first have
to determine the modulation order in use for each symbol before completing this attack.
Evaluation of the efficacy of such a determination is beyond the scope of this dissertation
and is left as an area of future research.
Using this exhaustive key search attack method, the correct data frame is the decoding
result of one of the possible combinations of the brute force search variables. The number
of possible combinations is given as
2𝑏 · 𝑏! · 2! · 2|SOK𝑚 | . (5.40)
The number of combinations for a few example systems with PRNG seed space equal
to |SOK𝑚 | = 64 bits and various modulations are provided in Table 5.9 for comparison.
Attack complexity in bits is calculated by taking the base two logarithm of the possible
combinations and rounding up to the nearest bit.
Table 5.9. Exhaustive key search attack complexity for GCH PLS based on





I QPSK 2.95 · 1020 68
J 16QAM 1.42 · 1022 74
K 64QAM 1.70 · 1024 81
L 256QAM 3.81 · 1026 89
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5.4 Combined Security
When both proposed PLS techniques are combined, the exhaustive key search attack com-
plexity of both schemes in bits is additive. This is a result of all brute force search variables
being independent of one another; thus, the number of possible combinations that must be
attempted in order to perform the exhaustive key search attack on the combined system is
the product of possible combinations required to attack the individual systems.
The number of combinations and attack complexity in bits for a few example systems with
PRNG seed space for each technique equal to |SOK𝑠 | = |SOK𝑚 | = 64 bits incorporating
various modulations and values of v𝑜𝑏𝑠 with 𝑎 = 9 are provided in Table 5.10 for comparison.
Table 5.10. Exhaustive key search attack complexity for both proposed PLS
techniques combined based on number of possible combinations for a few
example systems with 𝑎 = 9.




M QPSK [Alamouti] 7.02 · 1050 169
N 256QAM [Alamouti] 9.05 · 1056 190
O QPSK [MPO468] 4.24 · 1087 292
P 256QAM [MPO468] 5.46 · 1093 312
Q QPSK [Alamouti SPO334 MPO468] 9.44 · 10115 386
R 256QAM [Alamouti SPO334 MPO468] 1.22 · 10122 406
S QPSK [MPO468 NO442 SM441] 2.32 · 10120 400




In this chapter we present various results including primary channel BER curves for Monte
Carlo simulations and OTA testing of the alternating STC PLS scheme, evaluation of KRC
decoding as presented in Section 5.2.2 based on simulation and OTA testing, comparison
of GCH to alternating CD-PHY from the literature, and confirmation of compatibility of
GCH to hard or soft decision decoding methods.
This chapter includes adaptations from previous work already published or in publication
by the author. Specifically, portions of Section 6.1.1 are revised from [10]. Portions of
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 are revised from [11].
6.1 Alternating Space-Time Coding Bit Error Rate
BER performance over the primary channel when employing the alternating STC PLS
scheme is now provided for simulations first followed by OTA testing.
6.1.1 Simulation Results
Monte Carlo simulations are performed for three MIMO systems employing the alternating
STC PLS scheme with 𝑎 = 4 over a Rayleigh fading channel with AWGN. The three systems
include:
1. v𝑜𝑏𝑠 = [SM441] with 𝑁𝑅 = 4,
2. v𝑜𝑏𝑠 = [NO442] with 𝑁𝑅 = 2, and
3. v𝑜𝑏𝑠 = [Alamouti] with 𝑁𝑅 = 2.
The decoding techniques presented in Section 3.2.4 are compared for the first two systems,
and MRC as described in Section 3.2.2 is employed for the third system. A baseline
performance curve is plotted corresponding to theoretical expected performance of the
third system. This curve represents the baseline as all three MIMO systems under test
exhibit a combined diversity order (DO) of four; thus, expected ML performance for the
first two systems should exhibit the same slope as that of the baseline curve but with
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horizontal separation due to non-orthogonality of the employed STCs [66]. The decoding
techniques tested for the first two systems include the combined MMSE-SQRD and SIC
algorithms, denoted as SIC for short, along with the MATLAB communications toolbox
Schnorr-Euchner sphere decoder (SESD) [61], [64], [71]. Results for various modulations
are shown in Fig. 6.1.
It can be seen from Fig. 6.1 that BER performance degradation is more significant between
the two compared decoding techniques when employing SM441 rather than NO442. This
indicates that the significant BER performance boost is likely worth the additional decoding
complexity of performing follow-on SD techniques when using a SMSTC; however, this may
not be true for non-orthogonal STCs with transmit diversity depending on the application’s
required error rate. The BER performance of the third system matches theoretical expected
performance as shown by the baseline curve.
The same Monte Carlo simulations are performed again with twice the number of RX anten-
nas for each system to better understand decoding performance differences with additional
antenna resources. Thus, for the first system using the SM441 STC, eight RX antennas are
now employed. For the second and third systems using the NO442 and Alamouti STCs,
respectively, four RX antennas are now employed. Baseline performance curves are plotted
once again but with DO of eight. Results of these simulations with additional RX antennas
are shown in Fig. 6.2.
It can be seen by comparing Figs. 6.1 and 6.2 that there is much less degradation in BER
performance between the two compared decoding techniques when employing additional
RX antennas with either of the first two MIMO systems under test. This indicates that
SD techniques become less beneficial as additional RX antennas are employed. The BER
performance of the third system matches theoretical expected performance as shown by the
baseline curve.
6.1.2 Over-The-Air Testing Results
Portions of the alternating STC PLS scheme with v𝑜𝑏𝑠 = [Alamouti] were implemented as
an out-of-tree module in open source software called GNU Radio [72]. For simplicity, the
first two phases were assumed to be completed already; thus, with synchronized PRNGs




Figure 6.1. Comparison of decoding techniques for SM441, NO442, and
Alamouti STCs using various modulations and DO of four. (a) QPSK and




Figure 6.2. Comparison of decoding techniques for SM441, NO442, and
Alamouti STCs using various modulations and DO of eight. (a) QPSK and
64QAM. (b) 16QAM and 256QAM.
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of the GNU Radio flowgraph. The frame structure employed for OTA testing is shown in
Fig. 6.3, where each subframe contains sixty data symbols and four pilot symbols, denoted
as “P,” used for frequency synchronization. The training sequence at the beginning of each





















Figure 6.3. Illustration of OTA frame structure.
This setup allowed for initial OTA validation using Universal Software Radio Peripherals
(USRPs) at a lower center frequency and sample rate; however, it was desired to perform final
OTA testing within the 5G NR FR2 n258 band with a center frequency of 26.5 GHz [73].
To meet these requirements, in-phase and quadrature (IQ) samples from the GNU Radio

















Figure 6.4. Block diagram illustration of GNU Radio flowgraph for transmis-
sion.
These samples represent multiple frames of data plus an initial pad sequence that have
been pulse-shaped and upsampled using a root-raised cosine pulse with rolloff factor of
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0.2 and upsampling factor of 2. The IQ data was then converted into arbitrary waveform
files (ARBs) and loaded into two vector signal generators (VSGs) with horn antennas that
could support the desired center frequency and sample rate. Together, these VSGs served
as the BS. Each VSG contained an ARB with the IQ data corresponding to a single TX
antenna data stream. The VSGs were operated in a master/slave configuration and set to
continuously repeat the loaded ARBs when triggered by the master VSG.
A single spectrum analyzer with horn antenna was employed to serve as the UE in a
multiple-input single-output (MISO) system. For simplicity, the spectrum analyzer was set
to record IQ data when triggered by the master VSG; thus, course timing synchronization
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Figure 6.5. Illustration of MISO OTA test setup.
After IQ data was captured by the spectrum analyzer, it was exported for post-processing
within GNU Radio and MATLAB. The GNU Radio flowgraph depicted in Fig. 6.6 was used
to perform all synchronization and CSI estimation processes before exporting the received
sample vector, Z, and channel tap vector, h𝐵𝑈 , from (3.8) to MATLAB for further analysis.
MRC as described in Section 3.2.2 was performed in MATLAB to determine BER results.
In order to anchor BER to Eb/N0, observed SNR was recorded from the spectrum analyzer.
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Figure 6.6. Block diagram illustration of GNU Radio flowgraph for reception
and data export.
Figure 6.7. OTA testing SNR measurement.
Due to the choice of modulation, STC, and upsampling factor, the SNR is equal to Eb/N0
in this case. The observed BER results during OTA testing are given in Fig. 6.8. A baseline
performance curve showing theoretical results over a Rayleigh fading channel with DO of
two is provided as a reference. A theoretical AWGN curve is also included to serve as a LB.
In Fig. 6.8, it can be seen that the BER curve obtained through OTA testing lies between
these two theoretical curves as expected.
All of the final OTA test parameters are given in Table 6.1 along with calculation of data
rate.
6.2 Evaluation of Key Residue Class Decoding
In Section 5.2.2, after performing the initial four steps of the KRC decoding attack, analysis
continues by making the worst-case assumption that Eve is able to successfully determine
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Figure 6.8. OTA primary channel BER results for various values of 𝑎 with
baseline and LB theoretical curves.
the correct KRC for each codeword. We now look at both simulated and OTA results for
QPSK with various values of 𝑎 to better evaluate if this worst case is truly achievable.
We determine the probability of correct KRC determination, under specified conditions,
by measuring the percentage of codewords for which Eve could successfully determine
the correct KRC index, denoted as 𝑖𝑐, during step 3 of the KRC decoding attack. Eve is
considered to be successful if 𝑖 = 𝑖𝑐. This measurement is possible by applying eavesdropper
assumptions from Section 5.2.1 along with knowledge of the correct KRC based on the STC
employed for each codeword.
This probability is calculated for Monte Carlo simulations of a MISO system employing
the alternating STC PLS scheme with v𝑜𝑏𝑠 = [Alamouti], QPSK modulation, and 𝑎 = 4, 5,
and 6 for various values of Eb/N0. The results of these simulations are provided in Fig. 6.9.
As the value of 𝑎 increases and more PR angles are permitted, the number of KRCs increases
as shown in Table 5.4. Whereas the possible data symbol vectors remains constant for a
fixed STC and modulation, this increase in the number of KRCs allows for noise to have a
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Table 6.1. OTA test parameters.
Parameter Value




v𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑜 [2 1 7 4 5]
PRNG Seed 300
Center Frequency 26.5 GHz
Sample Rate 600 MHz
Capture Time (milliseconds) 12.1
Captured Samples 7,259,968
Pulse Shape Root-Raised Cosine
Upsampling Factor 2
Captured Symbols 3,629,984
Initial Pad Overhead (Symbols) 500,000
Frame Length (Symbols) 1,408
Captured Frames 2,223
Data per Frame (Symbols) 1,080
Captured Data (Symbols) 2,400,840
Captured STC Codewords 1,200,420
Modulation QPSK
Captured Data (bits) 4,801,680
Data Rate (bits per second) 396,833,058
Data Rate (megabytes per second) 47.3
greater impact on KRC determination. Thus, an increase in Eb/N0 is expected to be required
to obtain the same probability of correct KRC determination as 𝑎 increases. It can be seen
from the simulated results in Fig. 6.9, that indeed approximately 6 dB of additional Eb/N0
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Figure 6.9. Probability of correct KRC determination when employing the
Alamouti STC with QPSK and various values of 𝑎 based on Monte Carlo
simulations and OTA testing of a MISO system.
is required with each unit increase in 𝑎 to achieve the same probability of determining the
correct KRC. From these simulations, the likelihood of achieving the assumption of correct
KRC determination for every codeword is very low unless 𝑎 is small and/or the Eb/N0
observed by Eve is very high.
The same measurement is repeated for OTA tests discussed in the previous section. The
results of these tests are also provided in Fig. 6.9. It can be seen that the likelihood
of achieving the assumption of correct KRC determination is even lower for these OTA
conditions than with the Monte Carlo simulations.
It was desired to understand whether or not application of additional RX antennas by Eve
could improve this likelihood; thus, Monte Carlo simulations were repeated for the 𝑎 = 4 and
𝑎 = 6 cases with 𝑁𝑅 = 2, 3, and 4. Results of these simulations are provided in Fig. 6.10. It
can be seen that likelihood improves by approximately 2-3 dB by utilizing two RX antennas,
but application of more than two does not significantly improve results with diminishing
returns with each additional antenna.
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Figure 6.10. Probability of correct KRC determination when employing the
Alamouti STC with QPSK for various values of 𝑎 and 𝑁𝑅 based on Monte
Carlo simulations.
6.2.1 Extended Analysis
A natural extension of this analysis is to determine how many KRC decoding results have
lesser Euclidean distances to a potential data symbol vector than that of the correct KRC on
average. To facilitate this determination, we start by creating a set of Euclidean distances
between each KRC decoding result and corresponding nearest data symbol vector. This set
is then sorted in ascending order. A random variable, 𝑥𝑐 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑙}, is defined as the rank
of the distance for the correct KRC within the set, where 𝑙 is the set size corresponding
to the number of KRCs. Thus, the distance of the correct KRC decoding result to nearest
symbol vector has rank 1 (i.e., 𝑥𝑐 = 1) if it has the minimum distance to nearest symbol
vector of all KRC decoding results.
To obtain samples of this random variable for the completed Monte Carlo simulations and
OTA tests with 𝑁𝑅 = 1, an alternative step 3 of the KRC decoding attack is performed as
follows:
Step 3a ) Sort the index values of the 𝑙 KRCs in ascending order by Euclidean distance of
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the corresponding decoding result, ŝ𝑖 for 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑙}, to nearest potential data
symbol vector, s ∈ M𝑘 . Start by finding these distances, denoted as D(𝑖), for each
KRC decoding result represented as
D(𝑖) = min
∀s∈M𝑘
𝑑 (s, ŝ𝑖). (6.1)
Then sort the elements of D using the sort function, as described in Section 2.1.3,
to obtain the index values in ascending order of distance to nearest symbol vector
[55]. This is represented as [∼, I] = 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 (D).
For each codeword, the index value of I corresponding to the correct KRC index, 𝑖𝑐, is a
sample of 𝑥𝑐 (i.e., I(𝑥𝑐) = 𝑖𝑐). The expected value of 𝑥𝑐 minus one provides the number of
KRC decoding results that have lesser distances than that of the correct KRC on average.
Thus, 𝐸 [𝑥𝑐] is calculated empirically for the completed simulations and OTA tests with
Alamouti STC and 𝑁𝑅 = 1. Results are shown in Fig. 6.11, where it can be seen that 𝐸 [𝑥𝑐]
is significantly greater than one at low Eb/N0. Whereas all simulations converge to an
expected value of one as Eb/N0 increases, OTA tests with 𝑎 = 5 and 𝑎 = 6 never approach
this value.
The impact of this finding is a modification to key equivocation upon completion of the
KRC decoding attack. In Section 5.2.2, this uncertainty was given based on the assumption
that the correct KRC is obtained; however, this evaluation invalidates that assumption. The
revised key equivocation is based on completion of the four steps given in Section 5.2.2
with modified step 3a to obtain I. The expected value of key equivocation is dependent on
the KRC size as given in (5.10) and 𝐸 [𝑥𝑐] and is represented as
𝐸 [𝐻 (G|I)] = log2(𝐸 [𝑥𝑐]) + log2(2𝑘 (min(𝑎, 2)+1) · 𝑘!). (6.2)
Empirically determined values for 𝐸 [𝑥𝑐] are inserted into (6.2) with resulting values of
𝐸 [𝐻 (G|I)] shown in Fig. 6.12. It can be seen from this figure that the initial value of key
equivocation from (5.28) (i.e., 𝐻 (G|G𝐾𝑅) = 7 bits) serves as a LB that is approached as
Eb/N0 increases for the simulated cases; whereas the OTA test cases never reach this LB.
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Figure 6.11. Expectation of 𝑥𝑐 based on simulations and OTA testing.
6.2.2 Alternative Perspective
Another way of looking at this extension from Eve’s perspective is to determine how many
KRCs would need to be searched, in minimum distance order, to have a certain probability
that the correct KRC is within the set of searched KRCs. To facilitate this determination,
we look at the cumulative distribution function of 𝑥𝑐, defined as
𝐹𝑥𝑐 (𝑥) = P(𝑥𝑐 ≤ 𝑥). (6.3)
For the Monte Carlo simulations and OTA tests at Eb/N0 values nearest 32 dB, the cumu-
lative distribution functions of 𝑥𝑐 are provided in Figs. 6.13 and 6.14, respectively.
With matching parameters and channel conditions, these functions can be used to determine
how many KRCs would need to be searched by Eve to have a certain probability that the
correct KRC is within the set of searched KRCs. Under specified conditions for the Monte
Carlo simulations with 𝑎 = 4, 5, and 6, Eve would need to search the first 2, 5, and 25 KRC
indices from I, respectively, to have a 99 percent probability that the correct KRC is within
the searched KRCs. On the other hand, from the conditions observed during the OTA tests
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Figure 6.12. Expected value of key equivocation based on simulations and
OTA testing.
Figure 6.13. Cumulative distribution function of 𝑥𝑐 based on Monte Carlo
simulations at Eb/N0 of 32 dB.
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Figure 6.14. Cumulative distribution function of 𝑥𝑐 based on OTA testing at
Eb/N0 values nearest 32 dB.
with 𝑎 = 4, 5, and 6, Eve would need to search the first 32, 270, and 1987 KRC indices from
I, respectively, to have the same probability.
6.3 Gray Code Hopping Bit Error Rate Comparison
As the proposed GCH PLS scheme is similar to other constellation remapping techniques
presented in Section 1.1.2, we now provide a comparison between GCH and CD-PHY [18].
To illustrate the benefit of using GCH over CD-PHY, Monte Carlo simulations are per-
formed employing each of the baseline mappings from Section 2.2.1 with results provided
in Fig. 6.15. For all simulations, a Rayleigh fading channel with AWGN is represented.
Perfect CSI is assumed between BS and UE, and all assumptions about Eve provided
in Section 5.3 are enforced. For the purposes of comparison, the mapping employed by
CD-PHY is alternated as with GCH but with the larger set of all 𝑀! alternative mappings
available to CD-PHY [18]. A baseline performance curve showing theoretical results for
each modulation is provided as a reference.
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Figure 6.15. Theoretical baseline, GCH, alternating CD-PHY, and eavesdrop-
per BER comparison.
In Fig. 6.15, it can be seen that no BER degradation occurs between BS and UE when
employing the proposed GCH scheme as only BRGC mappings are employed. Conversely,
performance loss increases with modulation order when employing an alternating version
of CD-PHY. This behavior is expected as there are more non-BRGC mappings available
with higher order modulations, and CD-PHY does not restrict the set of mappings for use
as does GCH. For any incorrect ML decision, more bit errors are expected to occur when a
non-BRGC mapping is employed by the CD-PHY scheme as opposed to a BRGC mapping
used by GCH.
When employing either of these two PLS schemes, Eve makes a random guess at the
mapping in use and obtains an average BER of 0.5 regardless of the modulation type.
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6.4 Gray Code Hopping Hard versus Soft Decision Decod-
ing
As stated in Section 3.4.2, the equivalent GCH demodulator may be used regardless of
whether hard or soft decision decoding is employed. To confirm this statement, Monte
Carlo simulations are performed over an AWGN channel using the MATLAB 5G toolbox
implementation of LDPC encoding and decoding with 64QAM symbols [71]. Simulations
are repeated using hard and soft decision decoding, with and without incorporation of the
equivalent two-step method representation of the proposed GCH modulator and demodula-
tor. Results are provided in Fig. 6.16. It can be seen that GCH results in no BER performance
degradation regardless of employed decoding method as expected.
Figure 6.16. BER comparison of LDPC encoded 64QAM using hard and soft
decision decoding with and without GCH.
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In this dissertation, we started by reviewing several different types of PLS from the liter-
ature including those with and without elements of computational security. Based on our
literature review, we identified that no existing constellation remapping approach utilizes all
alternative BRGC mappings to maximize the uncertainty of an eavesdropper while main-
taining BER performance of the intended receiver. Additionally, we found that none of the
ST coding-based PLS schemes make use of all available degrees of freedom within the STC
structure to maximize security. Within this solution space, we developed a tailorable PLS
framework including optional techniques to alternate the STC and/or BRGC modulation
mapping in use over a wireless communications link.
In support of this framework, we presented implementation details including set building
algorithms, transmission and reception support methods, and single- versus multi-STC
alternation methods. The proposed solution was evaluated through information-theoretic
and computational security analysis, Monte Carlo simulations, and OTA testing. Analysis
showed that exhaustive key search is the least complex attack method for this PLS framework
based on findings that the alternative KRC decoding attack is unlikely to succeed and
requires considerably more computational time and effort when the STC in use alternates
as proposed.
This chapter includes adaptations from previous work already published or in publication
by the author. Specifically, portions of Section 7.1 are revised from [9]–[11].
7.1 Significant Contributions
Here we present a brief summary of the significant contributions of this dissertation.
7.1.1 Space-Time Code Sets
Whereas other ST coding-based PLS schemes have applied PRs across the TX antenna
data streams or columns of the STC matrix [25], [26], no existing approach has utilized
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these column PRs in conjunction with row and symbol PRs; row, column, and symbol
permutations; and symbol conjugations. This dissertation provided a set of algorithms to
systematically implement these operations to build extremely large sets of unique alternative
STCs.
7.1.2 Individual Space-Time Code Building
Traditional schemes often perform beamforming, precoding, or encoding by selecting a code
for use from a known codebook stored as a LUT [41], [58]; however, this practice becomes
prohibitive as set cardinalities exceed device storage capacity. To avoid this problem, a
method was presented to build specific selected STCs from the codebook for use as needed
without storing the entire codebook.
7.1.3 Decoding Methods for Alternating Space-Time Codes
Orthogonal, non-orthogonal, and SM STCs employ different decoding methodologies, but
each relies on a known code structure to properly perform channel equalization, co-phase
symbol copies as necessary, and sort data symbols into the correct location before de-
modulation of a received sample array. We presented adaptive techniques to perform these
functions based on a STC that changes with each codeword. Specifically, an algorithm was
given allowing for the intended receiver to update the combining matrix associated with the
alternating STC. A sufficient statistic for MRC of all orthogonal STC sets was presented
with proof shown in Appendix A. Monte Carlo simulations of these techniques provided
insight that SQRD and SIC yield adequate results with non-orthogonal STCs at low com-
bined DOs and with SMSTCs at higher combined DOs. SD provides ML results but with
increased complexity.
7.1.4 Novel Gray Code Hopping Technique
Whereas many PLS schemes modify the bit-to-symbol mapping of common modulation
constellations, no existing approach utilizes all alternative BRGC mappings to maximize
the uncertainty of an eavesdropper while maintaining BER performance of the intended re-
ceiver. This dissertation presented a modulation-based PLS scheme called GCH that meets
these requirements. Two equivalent implementations of a GCH modulator and demodulator
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were presented offering flexibility and simplicity. This allows for GCH to be readily imple-
mented in adaptive 5G NR modulation coding schemes. Monte Carlo simulations confirmed
compatibility of GCH with either hard or soft decision decoding methods.
7.1.5 Proposed Tailorable Physical Layer Security Framework
A framework was established for incorporation of one or both optional three phase PLS
techniques presented in this dissertation. Alternating STC may be used in any MIMO
system with choice of orthogonal, non-orthogonal, or SM STCs to achieve the desired
diversity-multiplexing balance in addition to demonstrated PLS benefits. GCH may be used
in any system employing common digital modulation schemes to provide PLS without
sacrificing BER performance. The two techniques may be combined to provide excellent
information-theoretic and computational security.
7.1.6 Adaptation of Security System Nomenclature
Nomenclature common to secrecy systems had not previously been applied to ST coding-
based PLS schemes. We adapted definitions of cryptograms, KRs, KRCs, and message
and cryptogram residue classes for this purpose. These definitions were utilized to provide
information-theoretic security analysis of the proposed alternating STC scheme. It was
shown that our message and cryptogram residue classes created when employing only a
single KRC meet the properties for those of a pure cipher system in [13, Theorem 3].
7.1.7 Over-The-Air Testing of Alternating Space-Time Code Physical
Layer Security
The data transmission phase of the proposed alternating STC PLS scheme was implemented
first in open source software called GNU Radio and finally tested OTA in a MISO system
using two VSGs and a single spectrum analyzer to serve as the BS and UE, respectively.
The Alamouti STC was employed with QPSK modulation at a center frequency of 26.5
GHz utilizing 300 MHz bandwidth and achieving a data rate of 47.3 megabytes per second.
A BER performance curve was established demonstrating an observed channel within the
range of AWGN and Rayleigh fading.
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7.1.8 Comparison of Alternative Attack Methods
KRC decoding and exhaustive key search attack methods were compared for the alternating
STC scheme. KRC decoding was performed against Monte Carlo simulations and OTA test
results proving that determination of the correct KRC for every codeword of a recorded
communications session is highly unlikely. Exhaustive key search was shown to be the least
complex attack against both PLS schemes presented.
7.2 Future Work
In our discussion of base code permutations in Section 4.1.6, it was mentioned that complex-
ity of the exhaustive key search attack for a multi-STC alternation scheme could potentially
be increased by introducing a base code order vector as an additional SIM unique content. In
addition to this modification specific to multi-STC implementations, our discussion of the
exhaustive key search attack complexity of all systems employing the alternating STC PLS
technique was based on a reasonable assumption that could be more extensively validated.
Specifically, it was assumed that every unique combination of session variables and PRNG
state at the beginning of the data transmission phase yields a unique sequence of alternative
STCs for a communications session of a given length.
Evaluation of the exhaustive key search attack complexity when incorporating GCH within
an adaptive modulation coding scheme where the modulation order changes throughout a
communications session based on channel conditions was not completed. Similar to the
alternating STC attack, our discussion of the exhaustive key search attack complexity of all
GCH implementations was based on a reasonable assumption that could be more extensively
validated. Specifically, it was assumed that every unique combination of session variables
and PRNG state at the beginning of the data transmission phase yields a unique sequence
of mappings for a communications session of a given length.
General purpose processors were used to implement the data transmission phase of alter-
nating STC. For the Alamouti STC with 𝑎 = 4, an average of nearly 100 nanoseconds
was required to build each individual alternative STC. If this technique were executed in
realtime, then data rate for QPSK would be limited to 4.8 megabytes per second at this rate
of Alamouti STC generation. A field programmable gate array implementation would likely
be able to improve the speed at which individual STCs are built for use with this technique.
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Alternatively, algorithm optimization may be able to provide necessary speed-ups. One
possible optimization would be to apply all symbol algorithms to the data symbol vector
instead of the STC.
Although multi-STC alternation schemes were discussed in general, it may be desirable to
devise a system to balance TX diversity versus bandwidth efficiency demands through a
selection bias for each of the STCs provided in a multi-STC implementation of this scheme.
This system could be adaptive in order to update the bias within a session; thus, if frame error
rates begin to rise, the bias towards an orthogonal STC could be increased to compensate.
Likewise, if frame error rates begin to drop, the bias towards an SMSTC could be increased
to improve bandwidth efficiency. This system would obviously require a method for both
the BS and UE to adjust biases in the same manner with or without feedback.
Finally, additional modes of operation for the alternating STC scheme could be researched.
At present, the data symbol vector contains the transmitted message; however, a pre-
determined data symbol vector could be employed instead, creating a known message
residue class. The next set of data bits to be transmitted could then be used to index into
this message residue class to retrieve a data symbol vector to be embedded within the next
codeword. Thus, to decode the message, UE would use the next alternating STC to retrieve
the embedded symbol vector. The index of this symbol vector within the known message
residue class would be the received message.
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APPENDIX A:
Proof of Maximal Ratio Combining Sequence
In this appendix, we prove the MPO334 STC to be compatible with the two-step MRC
sequence given in Section 3.2.2 along with Algorithm S8 given in Section 3.2.3.
This appendix includes adaptations from previous work already published or in publication
by the author. Specifically, portions are revised from [9] and [10].






























































To confirm the sufficient statistic, (3.14) is calculated first to obtain


























































































































































































Then, (3.13) is used iteratively for 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑘} to confirm (3.12).
With 𝑘 = 3, 𝑥 = 1, and 𝑦 = 1,
Ĥ(1, 1) =H𝑖𝑛𝑡 (1, 1) + H∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (4, 4)













+ 0 + 0
=| |h𝐵𝑈 | |2.
(A.4)
With 𝑘 = 3, 𝑥 = 2, and 𝑦 = 1,
Ĥ(2, 1) =H𝑖𝑛𝑡 (2, 1) + H∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (5, 4)


















With 𝑘 = 3, 𝑥 = 3, and 𝑦 = 1,
Ĥ(3, 1) =H𝑖𝑛𝑡 (3, 1) + H∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (6, 4)























With 𝑘 = 3, 𝑥 = 1, and 𝑦 = 2,
Ĥ(1, 2) =H𝑖𝑛𝑡 (1, 2) + H∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (4, 5)
+H𝑖𝑛𝑡 (1, 5) + H∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (4, 2)














With 𝑘 = 3, 𝑥 = 2, and 𝑦 = 2,
Ĥ(2, 2) =H𝑖𝑛𝑡 (2, 2) + H∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (5, 5)













+ 0 + 0
=| |h𝐵𝑈 | |2.
(A.8)
With 𝑘 = 3, 𝑥 = 3, and 𝑦 = 2,
Ĥ(3, 2) =H𝑖𝑛𝑡 (3, 2) + H∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (6, 5)
























With 𝑘 = 3, 𝑥 = 1, and 𝑦 = 3,
Ĥ(1, 3) =H𝑖𝑛𝑡 (1, 3) + H∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (4, 6)



















With 𝑘 = 3, 𝑥 = 2, and 𝑦 = 3,
Ĥ(2, 3) =H𝑖𝑛𝑡 (2, 3) + H∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (5, 6)



















With 𝑘 = 3, 𝑥 = 3, and 𝑦 = 3,
Ĥ(3, 3) =H𝑖𝑛𝑡 (3, 3) + H∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (6, 6)







2 + 0 + 0 = | |h𝐵𝑈 | |
2.
(A.12)
Thus, (3.12) is validated, and the sufficient statistic is met for MRC.
For the communications link given in Section 3.2.1 with 𝑁𝑅 = 1, the 𝑟-by-1 received sample
vector is represented as


























































































𝑠1ℎ1 + 𝑠2ℎ2 + 𝑠3ℎ3√2 + 𝑛1
𝑠3ℎ3√
2


























With this received vector, the first step of the MRC sequence given in (3.9) is calculated to
obtain









































𝑠1ℎ1 + 𝑠2ℎ2 + 𝑠3ℎ3√2 + 𝑛1
𝑠3ℎ3√
2






























































































































































































































The second step given in (3.10) is then used iteratively for 𝑥 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑘} to obtain the
estimated data symbol vector, ŝ.
With 𝑘 = 3 and 𝑥 = 1,
ŝ(1) =
ŝ𝑖𝑛𝑡 (1) + ŝ∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (4)













| |h𝐵𝑈 | |2
.
(A.15)
With 𝑘 = 3 and 𝑥 = 2,
ŝ(2) =
ŝ𝑖𝑛𝑡 (2) + ŝ∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (5)













| |h𝐵𝑈 | |2
.
(A.16)
With 𝑘 = 3 and 𝑥 = 3,
ŝ(3) =
ŝ𝑖𝑛𝑡 (3) + ŝ∗𝑖𝑛𝑡 (6)






















Additional KR examples are included in this appendix to provide further clarification of the
tabular and matrix form KRs with different base STCs.
This appendix includes adaptations from previous work already published or in publication
by the author. Specifically, portions are revised from [9] and [10].
Recall the MPO334 variant code originally given in (3.18) as
G =































The tabular form KR of (3.18) is provided in Table B.1. The matrix form KR of (3.18) is
determined by phase rotating symbols 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 and conjugating symbols 𝑠2 and 𝑠3. The











































1.1.1 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/4 (1, 1) (2, 2)
1.2.1 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗7𝜋/4 (2, 1) (1, 2)
2.1.1 1 (3, 1) (4, 1)
2.1.2 −1 (3, 2) (4, 2)
3.1.1 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗5𝜋/42 (1, 1) (3, 3)
3.2.1 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/4 (3, 1) (1, 3)
3.1.2 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗5𝜋/42 (1, 1) (4, 3)
3.2.2 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/4 (4, 1) (1, 3)
4.1.1 Conj. −1/2 (2, 1) (3, 3)
4.2.1 Conj. (3, 1) (2, 3)
4.1.2 Conj. −1/2 (2, 1) (4, 3)
4.2.2 Conj. (4, 1) (2, 3)
5.1.1 1 (3, 1) (4, 1)
5.2.1 −1 (3, 3) (4, 3)
5.3.1 −1 (3, 3) (4, 3)
6.1.1 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗7𝜋/42 (1, 2) (3, 3)
6.2.1 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/4 (3, 2) (1, 3)
6.1.2 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/42 (1, 2) (4, 3)








7.1.1 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/22 (2, 2) (3, 3)
7.2.1 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗𝜋/2 (3, 2) (2, 3)
7.1.2 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗 𝜋/22 (2, 2) (4, 3)
7.2.2 Conj. 𝑒 𝑗3𝜋/2 (4, 2) (2, 3)
8.1.1 −1 (3, 2) (4, 2)
8.2.1 1 (3, 3) (4, 3)
8.3.1 1 (3, 3) (4, 3)
9.1.1 1 (1, 1) (1, 1)
9.2.1 1 (2, 1) (2, 1)
9.3.1 1√
2
(3, 1) (3, 1)
9.3.2 1√
2
(4, 1) (4, 1)






























The tabular form KR of (B.2) is provided in Table B.2. The matrix form KR of (B.2) is
determined by phase rotating symbol 𝑠2, conjugating symbols 𝑠2 and 𝑠3, and permuting
symbols 𝑠1 and 𝑠2. Note that since the left-hand column contains summation terms, the
second column is used as the reference column. Also, the top and bottom terms in the
reference column are weighted by 1/
√







































1.1.1 Conj. −1 (1, 1) (2, 2)
1.2.1 Conj. (2, 1) (1, 2)
1.1.2 Conj. −1 (4, 1) (2, 2)
1.2.2 Conj. (2, 1) (4, 2)
2.1.1 Conj. −1 (1, 1) (3, 2)
2.2.1 Conj. (3, 1) (1, 2)
2.1.2 Conj. −1 (4, 1) (3, 2)
2.2.2 Conj. (3, 1) (4, 2)
3.1.1 −1 (1, 1) (4, 1)
3.2.1 −1 (1, 1) (4, 1)
3.3.1 1 (1, 2) (4, 2)
4.1.1 Conj. −1 (1, 1) (2, 3)
4.2.1 Conj. (2, 1) (1, 3)
4.1.2 Conj. (4, 1) (2, 3)








5.1.1 Conj. −1 (1, 1) (3, 3)
5.2.1 Conj. (3, 1) (1, 3)
5.1.2 Conj. (4, 1) (3, 3)
5.2.2 Conj. −1 (3, 1) (4, 3)
6.1.1 1 (1, 1) (4, 1)
6.2.1 1 (1, 1) (4, 1)
6.3.1 −1 (1, 3) (4, 3)
7.1.1 1 (1, 2) (4, 2)
7.1.2 −1 (1, 3) (4, 3)
8.1.1 Conj. −1 (2, 2) (3, 3)
8.2.1 Conj. (3, 2) (2, 3)
9.1.1 1√
2
(1, 2) (1, 2)
9.2.1 1 (2, 2) (2, 2)
9.3.1 1 (3, 2) (3, 2)
9.1.2 1√
2
(4, 2) (4, 2)
Recall the NO442 base code originally given in (2.10) as
G =










The tabular form KR of (2.10) is provided in Table B.3. The matrix form KR of (2.10) is
determined by phase rotating and conjugating 𝑠2 and 𝑠4. Note that the first and third columns
are the reference columns as they are the leftmost columns that collectively contain all data
symbols within the data symbol vector. Column two is not a reference column as it only
139
contains data symbols that are also contained within the first reference column. The matrix
form KR is represented as
G𝐾𝑅 =










Table B.3. Tabular form KR for the NO442 base code shown in (2.10).




1.1.1 Conj. (1, 1) (2, 2)
1.2.1 Conj. −1 (2, 1) (1, 2)
2.1.1 Conj. (1, 3) (2, 4)
2.2.1 Conj. −1 (2, 3) (1, 4)
3.1.1 1 (1, 1) (1, 1)
3.2.1 1 (2, 1) (2, 1)
3.3.1 1 (1, 3) (1, 3)
3.4.1 1 (2, 3) (2, 3)
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